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Abstract
With technology scaling, integrated circuits (ICs) suffer from increasing process,
voltage, and temperature (PVT) variations and aging effects. In most cases, these
reliability threats manifest themselves as timing errors on speed-paths (i.e., criti-
cal or near-critical paths) of the circuit. Embedding a large design guard band to
prevent timing errors to occur is not an attractive solution, since this conservative
design methodology diminishes the benefit of technology scaling. This creates
several challenges on build a reliable systems, and the key problems include (i)
how to optimize circuit’s timing performance with limited power budget for ex-
plosively increased potential speed-paths; (ii) how to generate high quality delay
test pattern to capture ICs’ accurate worst-case delay; (iii) to have better power and
performance tradeoff, we have to accept some infrequent timing errors in circuit’s
the usage phase. Therefore, the question is how to achieve online timing error
resilience.
To address the above issues, we first develop a novel technique to identify
so-called false paths, which facilitate us to find much more false paths than con-
ventional methods. By integrating our identified false paths into static timing
analysis tool, we are able to achieve more accurate timing information and also
save the cost used to optimize false paths. Then, due to the fact that existing de-
lay automated test pattern generation (ATPG) methods may generate test patterns
that are functionally-unreachable, and such patterns may incur excessive (or lim-
i
ited) power supply noise (PSN) on sensitized paths in test mode, thus leading to
over-testing or under-testing of the circuits, we propose a novel pseudo-functional
ATPG tool. By taking both circuit layout information and functional constrains
into account, we use ATPG like algorithm to justify transitions that pose the max-
imized functional PSN effects on sensitized critical paths. Finally, we propose a
novel in-situ correction technique to mask timing errors, namely InTimeFix, by in-
troducing redundant approximation circuit with more timing slack for speed-paths
into the design. The synthesis of the approximation circuit relies on simple struc-
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In the passed decades, semiconductor industry kept evolving the manufacture tech-
nology at the rate indicated by the famous Moore’s law, which leaded to smaller
transistors, higher packing densities, decreased supply voltages and increased clock
frequencies, thereby contributing to the goals of higher performance and lower
power consumption. However, with ultra deep sub-micron technologies, there is an
increasing uncertainty for the timing behavior of today’s integrated circuits (ICs),
often manifesting themselves as infrequent timing errors on speed-paths [104,
103]. There are multiple factors that contribute to this effect: (i) inevitable static
process variation caused by manufacturing imperfection leads to the mismatch
of timing performance between the designed value and the actual one [116, 88];
(ii) dynamic environment fluctuation in supply voltage, temperature, and multiple-
input switchings cause varying circuit delay at runtime [11, 105]; (iii) circuit aging
mechanisms such as hot carrier injection (HCI) and negative-bias temperature in-
stability (NBTI) lead to gradual increase of circuit delay over its lifetime.
1
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1.1 Challenges to Solve Timing Uncertainty Prob-
lem
In IC design, timing error resilience is fulfilled by cooperating series of works
through timing optimization, at-speed delay testing and online timing error pro-
tection. With ever-increasing timing uncertainty effect, we have to make a com-
prehensive improvement on every respects to achieve the goal.
To achieve ICs’ timing closure, timing optimization techniques [14, 16, 5, 6]
are developed at several phases of the backend design, from synthesis to physical
design. Successfully applying the above techniques heavily relies on timing analy-
sis [7] of logic circuits, by which the speed-paths are first identified and then are fed
as the optimization targets. Unfortunately, traditional timing analysis always fails
to predict the real speed-paths, thus resulting in missing the optimization focus or
even leads to the irrevocable timing failure after product shipping. For one hand,
the essential reason undoubtedly is the variation-induced timing uncertainty. To
solve that, statistical timing analysis method [8] is invented, while one of side ef-
fects is that it exponentially increases number of critical paths. On the other hand,
it is noted that the false path (also known as unsensitizable path), down which sig-
nal cannot propagate by any input pattern, is also a significant factor contributing
to the timing analysis inaccurate. Since the false paths do not induce any timing
error, by identifying those false paths [9] and integrating them in timing analysis
tool [10], it not only helps us to generate better timing result and improves the cir-
cuit performance, but also alleviates the burden of timing optimization algorithms
and saves the unnecessary cost used to reduce the false paths delay.
The false paths identification (FPI) is an important and relevant problem for
IC designers. The path sensitization criteria used in most prior false path iden-
tification techniques are based on automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) like
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techniques [101]. To be specific, for a given path, it is assumed to be sensitiz-
able if there exists a test vector pair (v1;v2) that activates a transition at the launch
point of a path and propagates to its ending point; if, however, we cannot find
such a test vector pair in any circumstances, this path is deemed as a false path.
Generally speaking, ATPG-based FPI techniques need to exhaustively search in
an input space to prove that a targeted path to be false. To alleviate this problem,
there have also been some implication-based false path identification techniques
(e.g., [91, 94]). Essentially, these methods use the same criteria to identify false
paths. The difference is that they try to prove the non-existence of test vectors us-
ing implication analysis instead of exhaustive search. The above techniques may
miss to identify some false paths due to the fact: for a particular path, even if we
are able to find a test vector pair that activates it, such a test may be functionally-
unreachable. Consider a finite state machine encoded with one-hot code, the legal
combinations of values in the circuit’s state elements are only those with a single
logic ‘1’ and all the others logic ‘0’. Consequently, if a path can be activated in
this circuit only with multiple logic ‘1’s in these state elements (i.e., containing
illegal states), this path is considered to be a true path based on the above criteria,
but in fact it is functionally unsensitizable.
For the taped-out circuits, manufacturing test is applied to verify their tim-
ing correction and guarantee quality of shipped products. As mainstream design-
for-test (DfT) technique, scan-based DfT makes automatic test pattern generation
(ATPG) viable for large ICs, which, however, changes the circuit states in test
mode, making them possibly different from that in functional mode, as mentioned
earlier. Under ever-increasing runtime environment fluctuation, the discrepancy
between functional mode and test mode has severe reverse effect on at-speed delay
testing for ICs fabricated with latest technology, and become a serious concern for
the industry [40, 45, 41]. Recent design evaluations have revealed that at-speed
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scan patterns were up to 20% slower than any functional pattern [107]. Conse-
quently, some good ICs that would work in application might fail at-speed delay
tests, leading to unnecessary test yield loss (also known as over-testing) [43]. To
reduce over-testing, several power-aware test generation methodologies were pro-
posed to reduce test overkills, by reducing switching activities in scan capture
mode to ensure the power integrity in manufacturing test [39, 47, 50]. This, how-
ever, leads to the concern for under-testing, i.e., if we over-restrict test power,
some defective chips containing speed-related defects may pass manufacturing
test, leading to test escapes [44] (also known as under-testing). Therefore, the real
question is: How do we make sure that circuits’ activities in test mode correlate
well with that in functional mode so that we can exercise the worst-case timing of
the circuits under test (CUTs) in their functional mode during manufacturing test?
With the continuous downscaling of transistor feature size, timing uncertainty
poses significant challenge to IC. On one hand, embedding a large design guard
band to prevent timing errors to occur is not an attractive solution, since this con-
servative design methodology diminishes the benefit of technology scaling [106].
On the other hand, it is increasingly difficult to rely on off-line delay testing to
guarantee circuit timing correctness in functional mode [107]. Consequently, there
is a growing research interest to achieve online timing error resilience.
Most of existing solutions for timing error resilience (e.g., the well-known Ra-
zor technique [31]) try to restore the state of the system to a known-good pre-error
state. These techniques are very effective for timing error correction (TEC) in pro-
cessors with microarchitectural support such as instruction replay, but they are very
difficult, if not impossible, to be applied to general logic circuits, due to the high
cost to checkpoint error-free states in such designs. In-situ timing error correction
techniques that are able to mask errors without any rollback, are therefore very
attractive. Among the few in-situ TEC techniques presented in the literature, most
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of them [108, 109, 110] rely on time-borrowing technique to correct timing errors,
by delaying the arrival time of the correct data to the next logic level. As these
techniques reduce the timing slack for the logic level that follows speed-paths,
they have difficulty to handle the case when speed-paths exist in consecutive logic
levels, limiting the applicability of such solutions. In [111], the authors proposed
to synthesize a redundant logic block that is activated only when the speed-paths
of the circuit are sensitized, and use it to mask timing errors on targeted paths.
While interesting, their proposed synthesis algorithm is time-consuming and the
redundant logic block incurs large area overhead.
1.2 Contributions and Thesis Outline
In this thesis, we present advanced techniques targeting to solve several challeng-
ing issues caused by ever-increasing timing uncertainty of IC.
Chapter 3 is concerned with finding timing-independent false paths that cannot
be sensitized under any signal arrival time condition in integrated circuits. Existing
techniques regard a path as a true path as long as a vector pair can be found to
sensitize it. This is rather pessimistic since such a path might be activated only
with illegal states in the circuit and hence it is actually functionally-unsensitizable.
In this part, we adapt the illegal state identification technique presented in [100]
and integrate it into our FPI flow. For a given critical path, we present effective
and efficient techniques to check whether it is a true path or a false path. We also
present novel solutions to address the more general problem of finding as many
false paths in a circuit as possible.
Motivated by the fact that current at-speed delay patterns cannot effectively
activate the circuits’ worst case functional delay under more and more severe run-
time environment fluctuation, thus lead to either test yield loss or test escape. In
Chapter 4, we present novel pseudo-functional ATPG techniques to simultane-
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ously reduce both over-testing and under-testing in at-speed delay testing. Firstly,
by taking the circuit layout information into account, functional constraints related
to critical paths are extracted. Then, we generate functionally-reachable test cubes
for delay faults in the circuit. Finally, we use ATPG-like algorithm to generate
switching activities that pose the worst case power supply noises on sensitized
critical paths under the consideration of functional constraints.
Despite that our proposed at-speed delay test methodology in Chatper 4 has
significantly enhance test quality, it is inevitable that some timing error will escape
to the usage phase and cause fatal timing error. Moreover, considering aging effect,
the delay on circuits’ critical paths gradually degrade and finally exhibit timing
error. In Chapter 5, we propose a novel in-situ correction technique to mask timing
errors, namely InTimeFix, by introducing redundant approximation circuit into the
original design, we are able to create a logically-equivalent yet timing-improved
circuit, and prove its correctness. The proposed low-cost and scalable synthesis
technique timing error masking logic based on simple structural analysis.
In Chapter 6, we summarizes this thesis and points out the directions for future
work.
2 End of chapter.
Chapter 2
Background
For better understanding the content this thesis, we present some background
knowledge relevant research areas. In order to effectively address the timing un-
certainty issues, in section 2.1, we detail the factors that contribute to timing un-
certainty and to understand how do these factors work. Next, we first roughly
introduce the technical flow to solve timing uncertainty problem with section 5.4.
Finally, the main technical background targeting timing uncertainty will be de-
tailed in section 2.3.2, 2.4.3 and 2.5.
2.1 Sources of Timing Uncertainty
2.1.1 Process Variation
Due to the imperfect manufacturing process, it is not possible to precisely control
the design parameters for all the transistors on the silicon.
There are several sources of process variation, and the first one is the random
dopant fluctuation. In CMOS technology, dopant atoms are doped into transistors’
channel to control the threshold voltage. As transistor size shrinking, number of in-
jected dopant atoms decreases significantly, which can be observed from Fig. 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Average number of dopant atoms in the channel as a function of tech-
nology node from [28]
According to industrial data [103], there are tens of dopant atoms left for 32-nm
generation. Therefore, the dopant distribution randomness increase dramatically,
leading to significant variability. The second source is sub-wavelength lithography,
which is originated since 0.25-µm technology node. It is noted from Fig. 2.2, 193
nm wavelength of light is used to pattern the transistors since 130 nm. The gap in
light wavelength and transistor size will continue to widen until the appearance of
extreme ultra-violet technology. It is the primary reason for line width roughness,
and the source of transistor delay variation.
It should be noticed that process variation is fixed after fabrication and remains
effective over the entire circuit lifetime. To address the randomness issue, circuit
designer has to optimize numbers of paths which are potentially to be critical, and
leads to severe power waste.
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Figure 2.2: Lithograghy trend [29]
2.1.2 Runtime Environment Fluctuation
Circuit timing behavior is input vector dependent. For one hand, the critical path
exhibits delay only if it is sensitized by input data sequence. On the other hand,
even if a path is sensitized, its delay could vary because of different environment
factors which are related to input vector.
Dynamic power consumption due to the state transition causes local tempera-
ture hot-spot, which in turn creates temperature variations across the die, affect-
ing circuit performance. Power supply variation is another factor causing timing
uncertainty. Inductive overshooting generated by sudden current increasing and
resistive voltage drop due to high computational activity make supply voltage on
power distribution network very sensitive to input vector. Furthermore, the prop-
agation delay of on path transistor also suffers from some other coupling noise
effects, for instance, interconnect cross talking.
Under runtime environment fluctuation, the traditional ATPG tool is increas-
ingly difficult to generate high quality pattern to verify circuit timing correctness.
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Figure 2.3: Aging trend
2.1.3 Aging Effect
In the usage phase, circuit performance degrades gradually by all kind of aging
effects. Study in [103] releases that transistor’s saturation current decreases over
year due to the effects such as oxide wear out and hot carrier injection. To cope
with this thread, traditional design relied on simple guardband to bypass the anal-
ysis and optimize these time-dependent effects. As demonstrated by famous bath
tube curve Fig. 2.3, these reliability degradation is exacerbated as the aggressive
scaling, and conservative design will lead to excessive over-margining.
2.2 Technical Flow to Solve Timing Uncertainty Prob-
lem
During circuit’s life cycle, several techniques work cooperatively to guarantee its
timing error resilience, which is demonstrated as Fig. 2.4.
For digital circuit, design engineers start to consider timing issue from the





Timing driven back -end design 
Timing error tolerance
Figure 2.4: Flow to achieve timing closure
back-end design phase. With the RTL description, logic synthesis [13, 14, 15] is
used to transfer circuit into multi-level logic network under timing constrain. In
this step, timing analysis is conducted under some rough timing model, for exam-
ple, constant gate delay. Typical physical design is composed of many important
steps such as technology mapping [16, 17], floorplanning [18], placement [19, 20]
and routing [21, 22, 23], and each of them puts significant effort on improving cir-
cuit timing performance. In the above procedures, timing analysis is extensively
applied. Although more and more physical information is available, timing anal-
ysis result is still inaccurate due to timing uncertainty. To alleviate this problem,
false path aware timing analysis is introduced, whose background is presented in
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Section 2.3.2.
Process variation and delay defects introduced in manufacturing process may
lead to timing constrain violation, at-speed delay testing is conducted to verify tim-
ing correctness of circuits. There are of scan based delay testing techniques [23,
35, 25] developed previously. Discrepancy between the circuit in functional mode
and that in test mode may lead to over-test or under-test problem, pseudo-functional
test method, therefore, is proposed to copy this problem recently, which will be de-
tailed in section 2.4.3.
In usage phase, we rely on timing error tolerance mechanism to overcome
timing violation due to the undetected timing error in testing phase or aging effect.
The background overview will be presented in section 2.5.
2.3 False Path
2.3.1 Path Sensitization Criteria
A netlist is composed of simple gates (i.g. AND, NAND, OR or NOR) and connec-
tion between them. A logic path Px is defined as P = (G0; f0;G1; f1::: fm 1;Gm),
which is an alternating sequence of gates and connections. Gate G0 is a primary
input and Gm is a primary output. Connection fi;0 6 i 6 m 1, is on-input of Px
which connect Gi to Gi+1. A connect is called a side-input of Px associated with
fi if it is connect to Gi+1 but not originated from Gi. Delay assignment depicts the
assignment of a delay to each connection in a circuit.
Under vector pair < v1;V2 >, the logic value stabilized at connection f and
output of gate G is called stable values at f and G, respectively. For given delay
assignment, the times when the end of f and output of G become stable under v2 is
the stable times at f and G under v2, respectively.
For given < v1;v2 >, the stable value and stable time are known for v2. Con-
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nection f , which is connected to G, is considered to dominate G if the stable value
and stable time of G is determined by f . A path is said to sensitized by v1;v2 if
each on-input of the path dominates its connected gate. Under a delay assignment
M, a path is defined as a sensitizable path if there is at lease one vector pair which
can sensitize the targeted path.
According to [90] if there exists an input vector v such that all side-inputs along
Px are set to non-controlling values, then Px is static sensitizable. if there exists an
input vector v such that that all side-inputs along Px are set to non-controlling
values when the on-inputs of fi has a non-controlling value (no requirement for
the side-inputs of fi when the on-input fi is controlling value), the Px is functional
sensitizable.
It is notice that both static and functional sensitization are independent of the
delay assignment. Furthermore, functional sensitization is more relaxed than static
sensitization, and it is the necessary criteria to sensitize a path.
2.3.2 False Path Aware Timing Analysis
In static timing analysis, based on the connection information and the delay model
of components, a weighted acyclic direct timing graph is constructed. We can then
use a linear structural algorithm to find the longest path (or a number of long paths)
in the timing graph, giving a fast feedback to the designers about the performance
of the circuit. Due to the ignoring of operational conditions and functionalities
of components in the design, however, the critical paths being reported by static
timing verifiers may be not sensitizable, leading to pessimistic timing analysis
results.
Effective removal of false paths from static timing analysis is a critical task.
This is because, STA is used in the inner loop of many circuit optimization tools
to resolve timing issues and the effectiveness of such optimization processes is
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deteriorated with the presence of false paths, leading to sub-optimal solution or
even failure to achieve timing closure.
In a sequential circuit, paths start from primary inputs of the circuit or primary
outputs of sequential elements, namely launch points, and end with primary out-
puts of the circuit or primary inputs of sequential elements, namely ending points.
A path is a true path if a functional vector pair (v1;v2) can satisfy the functional
sensitization criteria. Otherwise, it is a false path.
2.4 Manufacturing Testing
Manufacturing test is typically conducted with the help of automatic test equip-
ment (ATE). When testing a circuit, both test patterns and the expected test re-
sponses are stored in the ATE. During the manufacturing test process, test patterns
are transported from ATE to the circuit, and then the actual responses captured
by the circuit are sent back to ATE to compare against the expected responses.
Those circuits that have different responses from the expected ones are marked as
defective products.
2.4.1 Functional Testing vs. Structural Testing
Functional testing was historically used to test IC products, wherein a large amount
of test patterns are required to completely excise the circuit’s functionalities. Gen-
erally speaking, the number of input patterns for functional testing will be 2n for a
circuit with n inputs. Taking a 64-bit ripple-carry adder as example, 2129 patterns
are needed to apply complete functional test, which would take 2:1581022 years
to finish such test on a 1GHzATE [1]. Due to such exhaustive nature of functional
testing, it is impractical for any reasonable-sized circuits. In addition, due to the
need of applying functional tests at speed, the functional tester is much more ex-
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pensive. The semiconductor industry hence mainly resorts to structural testing for
this duty, wherein test patterns are selected based on circuit structural information
and a set of fault models. One of the greatest advantages of structural test is that it
allows us to develop structural search algorithms to achieve efficient testing. For
the same 64-bit ripple-carry adder, 1728 patterns are enough for structural testing
based on stuck-at fault model (introduced later).
Defects in an electronic system is defined as the unintended differences be-
tween the implemented hardware and its intended design [1]. It is very hard to
generate tests for every possible type of physical defects. Fault models, therefore,
are proposed to abstract faulty behaviors induced by defects. To generate test pat-
terns effectively, faults are always modeled at a certain level of design abstraction,
such as behavioral level, logic/gate level or transistor level. Fault models at behav-
ioral level usually have no clear correlation to manufacturing defects and hence are
used more often in design verification rather than manufacturing test. Transistor
level fault models are also known as technology-dependent faults and are mainly
used in analog circuit testing. Fault models at logic level (i.e., circuit is modeled
as an interconnection of boolean gates, called netlist) are technology-independent
and over time have been proven to be quite efficient and effective for testing digital
circuits [1].
2.4.2 Scan-Based DfT
With the ever increasing transistor-to-pin ratio in IC products, sequential ATPG is
no longer applicable on today’s complex sequential circuits. The main purpose for
scan-based DfT is to increase the controllability (i.e., the ability to set a particu-
lar circuit node to logic ‘0’ or logic ‘1’) and the observability (i.e., the ability to
observe the state of a logic signal within the circuit) of the circuit’s internal node
so that it is easier to generate test patterns for the circuit. In scan-based circuits,
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Figure 2.5: Transform the D Flip-Flop to Scan Flip-Flop
we substitute normal flip-flops (FFs) with scan FFs (SFFs), making them directly
accessible in test mode. By doing so, from the test generation point of view, the
circuit under test is a combinational circuit and hence the more tractable combina-
tional ATPG can be used to generate test patterns.
SFFs can be implemented in various manners, e.g., mux-based SFFs, double
latched SFFs, level sensitive scan latches SFFs [2, 1]. Fig. 2.5 depicts the trans-
formation from a normal FF into a mux-based SFF. In the mux-based SFF, a mul-
tiplexor is inserted before the input of the FF with two inputs D and SD, which
represent the original data input and the scan data input, respectively. Scan enable
(SE) signal is used to select which channel as input of FF. By replacing normal
FFs with SFFs, these state elements can be connected serially to form one or more
long shift registers (called scan chain) through SD input, and the first and the last
SFF of each scan chain are connected with an input pin and an output pins of the
circuit. All the SFFs can be set as arbitrary states by shifting logic values into the
scan chains. Similarly, the states of these SFFs can be observed by shifting out the
contents of the shift registers.
The test procedure in scan-based testing can be divided into three phases.
 Scan in: SE signal is asserted to configure the circuit as scan mode. Test
pattern is then shifted into scan chains for Nsc clock cycles, where Nsc is the
length of longest scan chain;
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 capture: SE signal is de-asserted, and the circuit applies the test pattern in
functional mode and capture its responses into the same SFFs;
 Scan out: test responses are shifted out in the similar manner as the scan in
process.
2.4.3 Pseudo-Functional Testing
When testing delay faults in scan-based designs, it is possible to activate func-
tionally infeasible paths during test application [42]. If a chip fails a particular
at-speed test that exercises such paths, this chip may be able to work in application
but is considered as a bad chip. We solve this problem by the false path identifica-
tion technique in Section 3. However, even if we are able to generate test patterns
for those functionally-testable faults only, it is still possible that they incidentally
detect some structural testable but functional untestable (ST-FU) faults and hence
lead to test overkills [95], since non-functional patterns may generate excessive
delay on the targeted path considering runtime environment fluctuation.
To cope with this problem, several power-aware test generation methodologies
were proposed to reduce switching activities in scan capture mode to ensure timing
safety in delay testing to avoid test overkills [39, 46, 47, 50]. However, if we over-
restrict test power, under-testing might occur as some speed-related defects may
not exhibit themselves, leading to test escapes [44]. Therefore, the real question
is: How can we exercise the worst-case timing of the circuits in their functional
mode during manufacturing test?
Pseudo-functional testing was proposed to tackle the above problem and has
attracted lots of attention recently [51, 52, 53, 97, 99, 102]. In this technique,
instead of identifying ST-FU delay faults in the CUT, functionally-unreachable
states in the circuit are extracted and fed to a constrained ATPG tool, which back-
tracks immediately when illegal states are reached during test generation to obtain















Figure 2.6: Illegal State Identification - An Example
pseudo-functional patterns [95].
Illegal state identification is one of the fundamental problems in pseudo-functional
testing. Several approaches were proposed for illegal state identification in the lit-
erature, including SAT-based methods [51], implication-based strategies [97, 102],
mining-based techniques [99], and a recent justification-based method [100]. As
[100] is able to effectively and efficiently identify much more illegal states when
compared to other techniques, it is utilized in this work and we briefly introduce
how it works in the following paragraphs, using an example circuit as shown in
Fig. 2.6.
In [100], the authors studied the structural root cause for illegal states and
showed that they are mainly caused by multi-fanout nets in the circuit. That is,
illegal states would imply logic violations at different branches of the same multi-
fanout net, explicitly in the same time frame or implicitly across multiple time
frames. Based on this observation, this work defined the so-called justification
scheme at every circuit node in the format ofCube0! 0 andCube1! 1, denoting
that a state cube Cube0=Cube1 justifies logic ‘0/1’ on this node. For example, a
justification scheme FF0(1)! Input1(0) in Fig. 2.6 means that FF0= 1 can jus-
tify logic ‘0’ at circuit node Input1. All such justification schemes are systemati-
cally built for each net. Then, starting from a multi-fanout net, [100] derived illegal
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states using contradictory justification schemes. In this example, for the multi-
fanout at Input1, we have fFF0(1)g ! Input1(0) and fFF1(1)g ! Input1(1).
We can therefore conclude that the state cube fFF0(1);FF1(1)g is illegal as they
imply logic conflicts on this net. The above procedure are conducted for every
multi-fanout nets to find those illegal states that explicitly cause contradicting val-
ues on them.
Next, [100] expands the above-obtained illegal state cubes to the next sequen-
tial level, again, using the justification scheme information. For the example circuit
in Fig. 2.6, since fFF0(1);FF1(1)g is known to be illegal, obviously, those state
cubes that can justify this state cube are also illegal. Consequently, by combin-
ing those compatible state cubes that lead to FF0(1) and FF1(1), we can obtain
two new illegal state cubes, i.e., fFF2(0);FF4(0)g and fFF2(0);FF3(0)g. In
[100], the above expansion process is conducted for every illegal state cube until
it cannot be expanded any more. Compared to prior work that explicitly unroll the
circuit into a few time frames for illegal state identification, the above illegal state
expansion procedure is able to implicitly walk through unlimited number of time
frames of the circuit efficiently.
2.5 Timing Error Tolerance
In order to achieve timing error resilience, we can either predict the error occur-
rence or take proactive actions to avoid them or we need to be able to detect timing
errors after they occur and recover from them.
2.5.1 Timing Error Detection
There are many timing error detector designs presented in the literature (e.g.,
[12, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33]), and most of them are based on monitoring signal




















Figure 2.7: Razor Flip-Flop
transitions on speed-paths for a specified period after the clock edge. Let us use
the well-known Razor flip-flop [31] as a representative technique to demonstrate
how such error detectors work.
As shown in Fig. 2.7, Razor flip-flop includes a main flip-flop, an additional
latch called shadow latch and other necessary components. The main flip-flop
latches the output signal at the clock edge while the shadow latch, controlled by
an inverted clock, latches the signal half of the clock period later, which is always
correct. When timing error occurs, the main FF will latch an incorrect value, which
is different from that in the shadow latch. Therefore, results from the comparator
indicate whether there is timing error. Once there is timing error, the correct data in
the shadow latch will be written back to the main flip-flop and the errant instruction
will be flushed. Hence, each suspicious flip-flop, where timing errors most happen,
needs to be replaced with a Razor flip-flop.
2.5.2 Timing Error Recover
One widely-used error recovery scheme is to restore the state of the system to
a known-good pre-error state. Razor first implemented such a recovery scheme
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for timing errors with microarchitectural support. That is, when a timing error
is detected in a Razor flip-flop, the processor pipeline is flushed and the correct
result from the shadow latch is inserted back into the pipeline. Then, by replay-
ing instructions, the processor operates correctly with little performance penalty.
By taking timing error rate into consideration, voltage-scaling is utilized to allow
processor to run robustly at the edge of minimum power consumption, with occa-
sional timing error recovery for heavyweight computations. Razor enables better
than worst-case design by removing design guard band used to guarantee ”always
correct” operations, and has inspired a large amount of later research work (e.g.,
[32, 33]).
While Razor-like techniques are very effective for timing error correction in
microprocessors with the help of instruction replay, they are very difficult, if not
impossible, to be applied to general logic circuits, due to the high cost to check-
point error-free states in them. In-situ timing error correction techniques that are
able to mask errors without any rollback, are therefore very attractive. Existing
techniques in this area can be classified into two categories: logic error masking
and temporal error masking.
Among the few in-situ TEC techniques presented in the literature, most of
them [108, 109, 110] rely on time-borrowing technique to correct timing errors,
by delaying the arrival time of the correct data to the next logic level. As these
techniques reduce the timing slack for the logic level that follows speed-paths,
they have difficulty to handle the case when speed-paths exist in consecutive logic
levels, limiting the applicability of such solutions. In [111], the authors proposed
to synthesize a redundant logic block that is activated only when the speed-paths
of the circuit are sensitized, and use it to mask timing errors on targeted paths.
While interesting, their proposed synthesis algorithm is time-consuming and the
redundant logic block incurs large area overhead.
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Logic circuits typically contain a large amount of paths down which signals can-
not propagate in functional mode, known as unsensitizable paths, or simply false
paths [90, 9, 96]. These paths should not be considered during the design and test
of integrated circuits (ICs). For example, static timing analysis (STA) is an integral
part in the physical design optimization process (e.g., timing-driven placement) for
today’s IC designs, used extensively to achieve circuit timing closure. Optimizing
false paths, however, does not help to improve the performance of the circuit and
the associated cost of optimization and iteration is expensive [87]. Similarly, tar-
geting false paths during manufacturing test is unnecessary and may lead to over-
testing of the circuit [10]. Therefore, how to effectively and efficiently identify
false paths is an important and relevant problem for IC designers.
False paths can be categorized into three types: (i). timing-don’t-care false
paths with asynchronous or varying time budgets, such as those paths in asyn-
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chronous clock domain crossovers; (ii). timing-independent false paths that are
logically unsensitizable in functional mode; and (iii). delay-dependent false paths,
which are logically sensitizable, but cannot be activated since one or more on-path
signals are dominated by side-input signals all the time. Here the on-path signals
refers to those signals that lie on the path being considered, while the side-input
signals are the other signals driving the logic cells on this path. Generally speak-
ing, identifying timing-don’t-care false paths requires the knowledge of the design
and they are typically picked up by designers manually. Various automated false
path identification (FPI) techniques have been presented to identify the other two
types of false paths (e.g., [89, 9, 92, 10, 96, 101]).
When identifying delay-dependent false paths, we need to calculate the sig-
nal arrival times to determine whether the on-path signals are always dominated
by side-input signals. Consequently, if the circuit timing model is not accurate
enough, it is possible that certain true critical paths are claimed to be false and
hence are excluded from optimization, leading to a more serious problem of false
indication of timing closure and possible silicon failures [92]. This problem is ex-
acerbated with the ever-increasing process variations in advanced semiconductor
technology [88], as signal arrival times become statistical values. Therefore, in
this work, we focus on identifying timing-independent false paths, which cannot
be sensitized under any arrival time condition. These paths are guaranteed to be
safely removable in circuit timing analysis and manufacturing test.
The path sensitization criteria used in most prior FPI techniques are based on
automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) like techniques [101]. To be specific, for
a given path, it is assumed to be sensitizable if there exists a test vector pair (v1;v2)
that activates a transition at the launch point of a path and propagates to its ending
point; if, however, we cannot find such a test vector pair in any circumstances, this
path is deemed as a false path. Generally speaking, ATPG-based FPI techniques
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need to exhaustively search in an input space to prove that a targeted path to be
false. To alleviate this problem, there have also been some implication-based false
path identification techniques (e.g., [91, 94]). Essentially, these methods use the
same criteria to identify false paths. The difference is that they try to prove the non-
existence of test vectors using implication analysis instead of exhaustive search.
For a particular path, even if we are able to find a test vector pair that activates
it, such a test may be functionally-unreachable. Consider a finite state machine
encoded with one-hot code, the legal combinations of values in the circuit’s state
elements are only those with a single logic ‘1’ and all the others logic ‘0’. Con-
sequently, if a path can be activated in this circuit only with multiple logic ‘1’s in
these state elements (i.e., containing illegal states), this path is considered to be a
true path based on the above criteria, but in fact it is functionally unsensitizable.
Motivated by the above, we propose novel techniques to identify those timing-
independent paths that imply illegal states or other logic conflicts when they are
activated. To be specific, we adapt the illegal state identification technique pre-
sented in [100] and integrate it into our FPI flow. For a given critical path, we
present effective and efficient techniques to check whether it is a true path or a
false path. We also present novel solutions to address the more general problem of
finding as many false paths in a circuit as possible.
In our experimental results on ISCAS’89 and IWLS’05 benchmark circuits,
we show that a large amount of the false paths identified using the proposed tech-
nique are treated as true paths with conventional FPI methods. In addition, by
injecting the false paths identified with our technique into a commercial static tim-
ing verifier, the critical path delay for certain circuits can be significantly reduced,
indicating existing STA tools are often over-pessimistic.
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
preliminaries of this work and motivates this paper. In Section 3, we describe our
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proposed method to examine whether a given path is true or false by taking illegal
states of the circuit into consideration. Section 4 details our proposed techniques
to identify as many timing-independent false paths in a circuit as possible. Ex-
perimental results on several ISCAS’89 benchmark circuits are then presented in
Section 5 to demonstrate the effectiveness of our technique. Finally, Section 6
concludes this paper.
3.2 Preliminaries and Motivation
Most prior works determine whether a path is a true path by checking whether a
test vector pair that sensitizes the path can be found according to the following
criteria: for each logic element on a true path,
 When the on-path signal is a controlling value, there are no side-input signals
with controlling values that arrived earlier;
 When the on-path signal is a noncontrolling value, all side-input signals are
also noncontrolling values and they arrive no later than the on-path signal;
Various FPI techniques have been presented in the literature to find a sensiti-
zation vector pair for a path, typically using ATPG-like techniques [89, 9, 92, 10,
101]. When we consider the signal arrival time constraint in the above criteria, it
is likely that a path is sensitizable under one delay model but false under another
delay model [90]. Because of this, a critical path of the circuit might be mis-
takenly regarded as a delay-dependent false path due to inaccurate delay model,
leading to false indication of timing closure and silicon failures. This problem is
exacerbated with technology scaling, because it is increasingly difficult to con-
struct sufficiently accurate timing models such that we are highly confident that
delay-dependent false paths are guaranteed to be unsensitizable in silicon, espe-
cially considering the ever-increasing process variations in latest semiconductor
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Figure 3.1: False Path Caused by Illegal State - An Example
technology. To safely remove false paths from STA [92], this paper is concerned
about identifying those timing-independent false paths in the circuit, which are
guaranteed to be false under any arrival time condition.
3.2.1 Motivation
As discussed earlier, existing FPI techniques regard a path to be a true path as long
as a test vector pair can be found to sensitize it. However, none of them explicitly
considers whether this found vector pair is functionally reachable or not. This
is rather pessimistic because: if a path is activated only with illegal states in the
circuit, this path is a false path.
Let us use the circuit shown in Fig. 3.1 as an example. Consider the path P =
fFF1;A;D;F;G;FF4g, where a rising transition occurs at the launch point FF1
and propagates to the ending point FF4. To activate this transition, we need to have
an input vector to drive logical values for the on-path signals fFF1;A;D;F;Gg to
be f0;0;1;1;1g in the first clock cycle and f1;1;0;0;0g in the second cycle, as
shown in the figure. One vector pair on fFF0;FF1;FF2g, < 1;0;1;X ;1;1 >,
can be found to sensitize this path. Consequently, traditional FPI technique (either
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ATPG-based or implication-based method) would treat this path as a true path.
A closer examination of the vector pair, however, tells us that it is functionally-
unreachable. This is because, FF0 has to be the inverted value of FF2 in func-
tional mode according to the circuit structure, and hence fFF0(1);FF2(1)g is
an illegal state cube. At this moment, however, we still cannot claim path P is
a false path as we are not certain whether there exist other vectors being able to
sensitize it without violating functional constraints. Nevertheless, we can find out
that fFF0(1);FF2(1)g is implied by the transitions occurring on path P through
circuit structural analysis, as shown in Fig. 3.1 (denoted by the arrowed line). In
other words, fFF0(1);FF2(1)g is a necessary condition to activate path P, and
hence we can conclude it is a false path.
The above example motivates us to take illegal states into consideration in false
path identification and use implication-based techniques to efficiently determine
whether a path is a false path or not.
3.3 False Path Examination Considering Illegal States
In this section, we consider the problem of evaluating whether a given path is a
timing-independent false path. This procedure can be integrated into the inner
loop of existing circuit optimization tools. That is, before we try to optimize the
critical path reported by STA tools, we first quickly evaluate whether this path is a
false path to avoid unnecessary optimization efforts.
3.3.1 Path Sensitization Criterion
For identifying timing-independent false paths, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1 A path is a timing-independent false path if and only if there exists at
least one on-path signal such that when it is a non-controlling value, one or more
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of its corresponding side-input signals are with controlling values in functional
mode.
proof 1 The sufficiency of this theorem is obvious. That is, when an on-path sig-
nal is a non-controlling value while some side-input signals are with controlling
values, this path cannot be activated and hence is a false path. As for the neces-
sity of the theorem: (i). when the on-path signal is a controlling value, since we
are considering timing-independent false paths where the side-input signals can
arrive at any time, the path is sensitizable even if some side-input signals are with
controlling values since they can arrive later; (ii). when the on-path signal and
its corresponding side-input signals are all non-controlling values, similarly, the
side-input signals are likely to arrive earlier so that the path can be activated to be
a true path. Therefore, only if when the on-path signal is a non-controlling value
while one or more of its side-input signals are with controlling values in functional
mode, we can deem this path as a timing-independent false path.
Apparently, with the above theorem, we can derive the following lemma:
Lemma 1 A path is not a timing-independent false path if and only if, for any
on-path signal, when it is a non-controlling value, all its corresponding side-input
signals are also with non-controlling values in functional mode.
To sensitize a path with either a rising transition or a falling transition at its
launch point, all the on-path signals need to have transitions and hence they are ap-
plied with both logic ‘0’ and ‘1’ in two consecutive clock cycles. According to the
above lemma, for a given path P, to determine whether it is a timing-independent
false path, we only need to propagate logic ‘0’ and logic ‘1’ at its launch point
separately and examine whether those on-path signals with non-controlling values
(e.g., logic ‘1’ for AND gate) and their corresponding side-input signals also with
non-controlling values can co-exist during propagation in functional mode. They






Figure 3.2: Representation of Illegal States as Phantom Gates
are called the necessary set-up values to propagate logic ‘0’ and the necessary
set-up values to propagate logic ‘1’ for the path, denoted as NS0(P) and NS1(P),
respectively. To sensitize the path, both NS0(P) and NS1(P) must be satisfiable.
Again, let us use the the example path P = fFF1;A;D;F;G;FF4g shown in
Fig. 3.1. When propagating logic ‘0’ at launch point FF1, we need to justify
NS0(P) = fA(0);C(0);F(1);B(1)g in functional mode; when propagating logic
‘1’ at launch point FF1, we need to justifyNS1(P)= fFF1(1);FF2(1);D(0);C(0)g
in functional mode. SinceC(0)!FF2(1) and B(1)!FF0(1), satisfying NS0(P)
implies the existence of illegal state cube fFF0(1);FF2(1)g. Therefore, P is a
timing-independent false path.
3.3.2 Path-Aware Illegal State Identification
In [100], the authors try to systematically identify all the illegal states in a circuit,
which takes non-trivial runtime. For a particular path, however, only those illegal
states that are within its fan-in logic cone need to be considered when determin-
ing whether it is functionally-sensitizable or not, denoted as path-relevant illegal
states. Considering the fact that we are mainly interested in critical paths in timing
analysis, we propose to adapt [100] and integrate it into our FYP flow as follows.
We first conduct STA on the targeted circuits to find critical paths and record
their ending points. Next, for each ending point, we perform structural analy-
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sis to trace the relevant flip-flops within its logic fan-in cone. Different from the
method in [100], when building the justification schemes, we only consider those
state cubes composed of the traced relevant flip-flops. This strategy not only facili-
tates to save the effort to construct a large number of useless justification schemes,
but also automatically avoids to target those non-relevant illegal states. Hence,
it improves the efficiency of both illegal state generation and the later false path
identification procedures.
3.3.3 Proposed Examination Procedure
In the proposed method, we first extract illegal states of the circuit according
to [100]. Next, we insert phantom logic AND gates into the circuit to represent
them. As shown in Fig. 4.3, each phantom gate corresponds to an illegal state
by linking its corresponding flip-flop (directly or through an inverter) with a AND
gate, e.g., illegal state fA(1);C(0)g in Fig. 4.3. This representation has the follow-
ing advantages:
 we do not need to store illegal states as a separate list (e.g., a large number
of independent conjunctive normal form [95]) by naturally integrating them
into circuit structure;
 more importantly, by assigning the outputs of the phantom gates to be logic
‘0’s, if a path is sensitizable only with illegal states, it would result in logic
conflicts on the phantom gates and we automatically know it is a false path
without necessarily generating the vector pair first and checking whether it
includes any illegal state cube;
For a given critical path, according to the path sensitization criterion discussed
earlier, we conduct two-pass processing to determine whether the path is a timing-
independent false path, for justifying NS0(P) and NS1(P), respectively. For each
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pass, we first assign logic values for the circuit nodes according to NS0(P)/NS1(P)
and logic ‘0’ at all phantom logic gates, while leaving the other circuit nodes to be
unknown values. Then, we conduct forward propagation and backward justifica-
tion to obtain more logic values on those nodes that are initially unknown. If logic
conflicts arise during the above logic reasoning process (either at the phantom
gates representing illegal states with logic ‘1’ or at a multi-fanout net with contra-
dicting values at its branches), we can conclude the path is a timing-independent
false path; otherwise, it is not.
3.4 False Path Identification
In this section, we consider the more general problem of identifying as many
false paths in the circuit as possible, which is especially important for delay test-
ing [91, 94]. Since the number of the paths is exponential to the circuit size, it
is apparently impossible to use the technique shown in Section 4 to check path by
path. Fortunately, as discussed earlier, timing-independent false paths would imply
logic conflicts in the circuit at the phantom gates representing illegal states and/or
multi-fanout nets in the combinational logic network. Based on this observation,
we propose to identify false paths by targeting at their root causes structures, since
the number of inserted phantom gates and multi-fanout nets are much less than the
total number of paths in the circuit.
If a path segment cannot be activated in functional mode, all paths going
through this segment are false paths. In particular, if any section of a false path
segment is sensitizable, the false path segment is called a prime false path segment.
For example, the path segment fD;F;Gg shown in Fig. 3.4 is a prime false path
segment since sensitizing it implies illegal state cube fFF0(1);FF2(1)g while
both fD;Fg and fF;Gg can be activated in functional mode. Therefore, instead of
considering a whole path to be false or not, we target at a path segment in each run
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Figure 3.3: Flowchart for the Proposed Prime False Path Segment Identification
Technique
because such representation is more efficient.
Based on the above, we propose novel algorithms to systematically identify
prime false path segments in a circuit. The basic idea of our approach is to find the
minimum path segment Ps whose necessary set-up logic valuesNS1(Ps) orNS0(Ps)
imply logic conflicts in the circuit.
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index A(1) B(1) C(0) D(1) F(0) G(1)
context FF2(1) FF0(1) FF2(1) FF2(1) FF2(1) FF0(1)
Table 3.1: Implication Lookup Table.
3.4.1 Overall Flow
Fig. 3.3 presents the overall flow for our systematic prime false path segment iden-
tification algorithm.
With given circuit netlist, we first extract illegal states and multi-fanout nets in
the circuit. Next, we iteratively target one illegal state or one multi-fanout net in
each run. Static implication learning is used to build implications for any possible
internal circuit node that can imply values on the targeted illegal state elements or
multi-fanout net (detailed in Section 3.4.2). These implication schemes are then
stored in a lookup table as shown in Table 3.1, e.g., the entry B(1) represents a
implication fB(1)! FF0(1)g for the circuit shown in Fig. 3.4. For a given path
segment, we are now ready to determine whether it is false by quickly checking
whether the implications stored in the lookup table lead to any logic conflicts. For
example, for path segment Ps = fD;F;Gg, it is false since D(1) and G(1) imply
the illegal state cube fFF0(1);FF2(1)g according to the implications stored in
Table 3.1.
However, our objective is to identify as many prime false path segments as
possible, instead of checking a specific path segment is false or not. Apparently,
we cannot afford to consider every circuit node to be the starting point of a false
path segment. Fortunately, based on the implication lookup table built earlier, we
can extract a set of suspicious nodes as the possible starting point of prime false
path segments (detailed in Section 3.4.3). Then, for each suspicious node, we
create a so-called S-Frontier to record the path segment we have visited, which
contains the following items:
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 segment is used to record all the circuit nodes on the current path segment;
 launch value with 1/0 represents that we propagate logic ‘1/0’ at the launch
point of the segment stored in S-Frontier;
 implied cube records all the corresponding implication schemes of segment
in the implication lookup table;
Then, false segment identification is conducted by propagating S-Frontiers, as
detailed in Section 3.4.4. Our program terminates when all the illegal states and
multi-fanout nets have been considered.
Again, let us use the example circuit shown in Fig. 3.4 to illustrate our iden-
tification procedure. For illegal state cube fFF0(1);FF2(1)g, we build its corre-
sponding implication lookup table as shown in Table 3.1. Consider the suspicious
node D with D(1)! FF2(1), we create a S-Frontier with launch value ‘10 at
node D and then propagate it along the path. Accordingly, newly-implied values
are continuously added into implied cube, and once we reach node G, we obtain
fFF0(1),FF2(1)g in the implied cube of the updated S-Frontier and hence we find
a false path segment fD;F;Gg.
3.4.2 Static Implication Learning
For each targeted illegal state or multi-fanout net, single node implication is uti-
lized to learn which circuit nodes can justify the expected values on them.
Consider the illegal state fFF0(1);FF2(1)g for the circuit shown in Fig. 3.4,
we first conduct implication for their inverse values FF0(0) and FF2(0) inde-
pendently. For example, we can obtain fFF0(0) ! B(0)g since FF0(0) is a
controlling value for the AND gate. Similarly, we have fB(0) ! G(0)g, and
hence fFF0(0)! G(0)g according to the transitivity of implication. By apply-
ing counter-positive law, the following implications are stored in the implication
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lookup table: fB(1)! FF0(1)g and fG(1)! FF0(1)g. When conducting static
implication learning on multi-fanout net, we imply both logic ‘0’ and logic ‘1’
from the targeted multi-fanout net, apply counter-positive law and store the learned
information in the same format.
3.4.3 Suspicious Node Extraction
The starting point of a S-Frontier determines whether a false segment can be found
and which false segment can be found. Therefore, we need to carefully extract the
set of suspicious starting points to create S-Frontiers. The selection should satisfy
the following requirements: (i). all the possible false segment can be detected; (ii).
the selected starting points should be as less as possible.
After static implication learning, we define those nodes that have implications
as the affected nodes, e.g., nodes A, B, C, D, F and G in Fig. 3.4. Only affected
nodes can serve as the starting point of a prime false segment because the other
nodes do not contribute any implications to justify values on the targeted ille-



























Figure 3.4: Example to Demonstrate False Path Identification
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segment. At the same time, not all affected nodes need to be considered as the
starting point of prime false path segments. Take node C as example, which has
one implication fC(0)! FF2(1)g. It has two following logic elements D and
F . To propagate C(0), we can only generate D(1) and F(0). As can be easily ob-
served in Table 3.1, however, bothD(1) and F(0) imply FF2(1), therefore making
fC(0)! FF2(1)g in fact a redundant implication scheme.
Based on the above observation, we conduct pre-processing for the affected
nodes and we remove those nodes that only contain redundant implication schemes.
The rest of the affected nodes are defined as the suspicious nodes (e.g. nodes D, F
and G), and S-Frontier can only be created and propagated from them.
3.4.4 S-Frontier Propagation
The S-Frontier propagation is essentially a breadth-first search process. Firstly,
an S-Frontier is created at each suspicious node with launch value 0(1) and is
propagated along the path. Once an S-Frontier reaches a multi-fanout net, it will
be split into several copies and delivered to all branches of the multi-fanout net.
After propagating S-Frontier to a new node, we first add the new node at the
end of segment stored in S-Frontier, and we add new implications to its implied
cube, if any. If the on-input of the current node is with non-controlling value,
non-controlling value is assigned on the side-inputs and implications for the side-
input signals will be also added into implied cube of this S-Frontier. As shown
in Fig. 3.4, let us consider the propagation of S-Frontier from node F(1) to node
G(1). Since the on-input of node G is non-controlling value, we also need to
assign B with logic ‘1’ and add the implication fB(1)! FF0(1)g into the implied
cube. Also, we should check whether the implication schemes with the new node
include all the implications with the first node kept in segment of the S-Frontier.
If so, the implication schemes of the first node are redundant and hence we update













False path (#)WCDFalse path (#)WCDRuntime (s)
s1196 18 138 9 1000 4.05 78 4.05 82 4.05 1.67
s1238 18 126 5 1000 4.19 112 4.19 116 4.19 1.15
s5378 179 8516 392 1000 3.89 696 3.89 742 3.89 1.38
s9234 211 1109 271 1000 9.01 798 8.99 798 8.99 1.85
s13207 638 82651 1185 5000 13.06 4692 12.89 4986 12.15 37.62
s38417 1636 90983 1220 5000 11.42 3582 9.89 4440 9.76 8.9
s38584 1426 63558 791 5000 15.07 4380 15.04 4624 15.03 25.62
wb conmax 3316 2083 122 5000 4.72 89 4.72 102 4.72 16.9
DMA 3131 2097 97 5000 5.99 2330 5.98 2375 5.98 49.05
pci 3720 2442 141 5000 5.09 943 5.09 1120 5.08 12.083
usb 1960 30676 388 5000 4.34 2102 4.34 2322 4.32 64.3
ethernet 10752 4205 195 5000 9.78 355 9.33 431 9.02 236.267
vga lcd 17265 3096 90 5000 10.36 539 10.36 793 10.36 660.883
Table 3.2: Experimental Results for Static Timing Analysis.
S-Frontier by removing this node to guarantee that the obtained false path segment
is a prime one.
Finally, since we may obtain the same prime false path segments starting
from different suspicious nodes. Before propagating an S-Frontier, we first check
whether its starting point is the first node of an existing false path segment. If so,
we simply delete this S-Frontier as it must have been propagated earlier.
3.5 Experimental Results
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed solution, we perform three sets of
experiments on several ISCAS’89 and IWLS 2005 benchmark circuits. Our exper-
iments are performed on a 2GHz PC with 1GB memory.
In our first experiment, we extract a number of critical paths using Synopsys’s
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static timing analyzer PrimeTime [98]. As shown in Table 2, we use the proposed
method and the implication-based method presented in [91] to examine them. As
can be observed, both techniques determine that a large percentage of the reported
critical paths are actually false paths. For example, for s13207, by applying our
method, only 14 paths out of the the 5000 longest paths are deemed as true paths;
while 308 paths are reported to be true with [91]. Consequently, the proposed
method is more effective for false path identification.
In terms of timing analysis result, Columns 6, 8 and 10 present the worst case
delay (WCD) reported by PrimeTime1, [91] and the proposed method, respec-
tively. It can be observed that the three methods report the same WCD for several
circuits (e.g., s1196, s5378 and vga lcd). This is because the longest paths of these
circuits are in fact true paths. For other circuits, the true critical path delay can
be reduced after considering the false paths. Due to that our method can detect
more false paths, our WCD results is shown to be less pessimistic when compared
to [91]. In particular, for s13207, the worst case timing delay reported by us is
12:15ns while [91] returns 12:89ns. Our proposed FPI technique is very efficient
as indicated by the short runtime, which is an extremely important feature since it
can thus be tightly integrated into the inner loop of circuit optimization tools. It
should be highlighted that the above runtime includes the time used for path-aware
illegal state identification, and as can be seen in Columns 3 and 4, the number of
illegal states related to long paths is quite small.
In the second experiment, we present results for our systematic prime false path
segment identification algorithm, as shown in Table 5.2. Column 2 is the number
of prime false path segments acquired with the proposed method. We then feed
these segments into an ATPG engine built on top of an academic tool Atalanta [93]
to check whether we can find a vector pair to sensitize them. Column 3 gives the
1PrimeTime can report true critical path delay with its own FPI feature.









I = JU 100%
Runtime
(s)
s1196 108 18 90 20.00 56.35
s1238 202 16 186 8.60 60.59
s5378 755 316 439 71.98 85.9
s9234 929 106 823 12.88 93.85
s13207 80510 11826 68684 17.22 356.32
s38417 68864 10647 58217 18.29 290.52
s38584 37168 5056 32112 15.74 593.65
wb conmax 941 42 899 4.67 127.77
DMA 414 36 378 9.52 923.26
pci 5052 4644 408 1138.24 1561.48
usb 2351 1433 918 156.10 1738.60
ethernet 979 153 826 18.52 665.15
vga lcd 1105 97 1008 9.62 464.58
Average 107.28
Table 3.3: Experimental Results for Prime False Path Segments.
number of segments that the ATPG engine can find a solution to activate them.
Conventional method therefore would regard them as true path segments. On the
other hand, we also present, in Column 4, the number of segments that the ATPG
cannot find a vector pair to activate them. As can be seen in Column 5, in average
we can find 107% more false path segments using our proposed method, each of
which may correspond to multiple false paths. In particular, for some extreme
cases such as pci, most of the false segments are treated as true path segments
with ATPG-based FPI technique. It should be emphasized that, if we are not able
to find a sensitization vector pair for a path segment because ATPG engine aborts
computation, we cannot conclude such a path segment is false. The improvement
results reported in Table 5.2 is hence rather conservative. It is also important to
note that ATPG-like FPI techniques operate on a ‘path-by-path’ basis and cannot
identify prime false path segments efficiently.







I = O BB 100%
s1196 843 1509 79.01
s1238 1809 2687 48.54
s5378 4908 6389 30.18
s9234 282567 322827 14.25
s13207 2927528 20526546 601.16
s38417 253691 297198 17.15
s38584 1198836 1745552 45.60
wb conmax 653128 680372 4.17
DMA 9945 13261 33.34
pci 1569350 13076785 733.26
usb 79851 130086 62.91
ethernet 50417 67023 32.94
vga lcd 119472 149083 24.78
Average 132.87
Table 3.4: Experimental Results for False Paths Compared against Implication-
Based Method.
Finally, we compare the number of false paths identified with [91] and that
with our method, as shown in Column 2 and Column 3 in Table 3.4. Since we
only identify prime path segment, for fair comparison, the path counting algorithm
in [91] is implemented to count the corresponding false paths for our identified
segments. As can be observed, our proposed method are able to find much more
false paths than [91], around 132% more on average. In particular, for s13207 and
pci, we identify six times and 7 times more false path when compared to [91],
respectively. We attribute the reason for our improvement to the fact that a large
number of illegal states are considered in false path identification.
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3.6 Conclusion and Future Work
Effective removal of false paths from static timing analysis is a critical task to
achieve timing closure for state-of-the-art IC designs. It also facilitates to identify
untestable path delay faults. Traditionally, a path is regarded as a true path as
long as a vector pair can be found to sensitize it. In this work, we show that
the above criteria is rather pessimistic since certain paths are activated only with
illegal states in the circuit and hence they are functionally-unsensitizable. Based
on this observation, we develop efficient and effective FPI techniques to identify
those timing-independent false paths that cannot be sensitized under any signal
arrival time condition in integrated circuits. Experimental results on ISCAS’89
benchmark circuits show that our proposed technique are able to find much more
timing-independent false paths than existing implication-based and ATPG-based
FPI techniques.
In our future work, we plan to integrate the proposed efficient FPI technique
into existing circuit optimization tools (e.g., the open-source logic synthesis tool
ABC [86]) and conduct experiments on large industrial circuits.
2 End of chapter.
Chapter 4
PSN Aware Pseudo-Functional Delay
Testing
4.1 Introduction
Power supply noise (PSN) has an ever-increasing adverse impact on circuit tim-
ing with technology scaling. As demonstrated in [34], a 1% voltage change can
cause approximately a 4% change in gate delay in 90-nm, 0.9-V technology. Con-
sequently, it is essential to take PSN effects into consideration in at-speed delay
testing to guarantee that integrated circuits (ICs) fully meet customer performance
expectations.
Some prior works advocated to generate test patterns that induce maximum
PSN effects in delay testing to ensure the timing correctness of the shipped IC
products even in the worst-case scenario [35, 36, 37]. As shown in [107], however,
at-speed scan patterns can be up to 20% slower than any functional patterns due
to the discrepancy between functional mode and test mode in scan-based testing.
Consequently, such methodologies may lead to over-testing and induce significant
test yield loss. To resolve this issue, on the other hand, various low capture-power
43
CHAPTER 4. PSN AWARE PSEUDO-FUNCTIONAL DELAY TESTING 44
and low IR-drop testing techniques were presented to reduce the PSN effects in
at-speed testing [46, 47, 48, 50]. These test methodologies, unfortunately, lead to
the concern for under-testing. That is, if we over-restrict the PSN effects during
delay testing, some defective chips that cannot meet circuit timing requirement
may pass manufacturing test, leading to test escapes [38]. Therefore, to avoid
both over-testing and under-testing, the real question is: How can we exercise the
worst-case timing of the circuits under test (CUTs) in their functional mode during
manufacturing test?
To tackle the above problem, a layout-aware pseudo-functional testing tech-
nique targeting path delay faults was presented in [49]. By extracting functionally-
unreachable states (also known as illegal states or functional constraints) in the
circuit and feeding them into automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) tools, [49]
first generates functionally-reachable test cubes for every true critical path in the
circuit. Then, they used a heuristic to fill the don’t-care bits in the test cubes to
maximize power supply noises on critical paths under the consideration of func-
tional constraints. As pseudo-functional testing naturally minimizes the possibility
of over-testing while their proposed X-filling strategy is able to maximize PSN ef-
fects, [49] is able to simultaneously reduce both test overkills and test escapes.
Although the above pseudo-functional path delay testing technique is quite ef-
fective, it is inherently non-scalable due to the exponential number of paths in
the circuit and hence can only be used to generate a few top-up patterns for se-
lected critical paths. Today, timing-aware ATPG for transition faults has gained
wide acceptance in the industry to detect those small delay defects (SDDs) that
cause quality and reliability concerns for high-performance ICs. In this work, we
present novel pseudo-functional ATPG techniques to simultaneously reduce both
test overkills and test escapes in SDD testing. Firstly, by taking the circuit layout
information into account, functional constraints related to critical paths are ex-
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tracted. Then, we generate functionally-reachable test cubes for SDD faults in the
circuit. Finally, we use ATPG-like algorithm to generate switching activities that
pose the worst-case power supply noises on sensitized critical paths under the con-
sideration of functional constraints. Experimental results on benchmark circuits
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed technique.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
related work and motivates this paper. In Section 3 and Section 4, we detail
our proposed methodology. Experimental results on several large ISCAS’89 and
IWLS’05 benchmark circuits are then presented in Section 5 to show the effective-
ness of the proposed solution. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
4.2 Preliminaries and Motivation
Layout-Aware Pseudo-Functional Testing for Critical Paths
With a large set of identified illegal states, applying pseudo-functional patterns nat-
urally minimizes the possibility of over-testing, but under-testing may occur with-
out taking PSN effects into consideration during the ATPG process. To address
this issue, in [49], the authors proposed a pseudo-functional test pattern generation
technique to maximize the PSN effects on selected critical paths, targeting path
delay faults.
As [49] is well-related to this paper, we briefly review it here. In [49], a so-
called PSN effect weight (PEW ) was proposed to evaluate the PSN effect caused
by transitions on aggressors1. As the location of the aggressors should be close
enough to that of the victim so that they are competing for power supply, the
authors defined a so-called E f f ectiveRange as a pre-defined maximum distance
1For a critical path under test, the on-path logic cells and the cells that induce power
supply noise on them are denoted as victims and aggressors, respectively.
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between the aggressors and the victims. Within this range, PEW is defined as
follows.
PEW = 1 jXagg Xvicj=E f f ectiveRange (4.1)
where Xagg and Xvic denote the row-coordinate of the aggressor and the victim,
respectively, which represents the closer an aggressor is to a victim cell, the higher
PSN it induces on it.
At the same time, as pointed out in [37], the transition type of aggressor cells
(e.g., rising or falling) also plays an important role for PSN effects on a victim cell.
Consider an on-path victim cell in Fig. 4.1, to maximize power supply noise on it,
for those aggressor cells that are in the same row, they are desired to have the same
transition type as the victim cell; for those aggressor cells that are in different
row but share a common power wire with it, they are desired to have a rising
transition; while for the remaining aggressor cells that are in different row but
share a common ground wire with it, they are desired to have a falling transition.
Based on the above, [49] also defined a probability-based transition PSN metric
to evaluate the impact of X-bits on the PSN of targeted path from transitions of
relevant gates. Based on above, a novel X-filling heuristic is proposed to assign
logic values for X-bits in the test cube to maximize the PSN effects on selected
critical paths under functional constraints.
4.2.1 Motivation
As shown in [49],simply maximizing or minimizing PSN effects in at-speed de-
lay testing is not a good strategy since such one-sided solutions are inevitable to
result in the concern of the other side. The work in [49] made a good attempt to
tackle this problem considering path delay faults. However, since the number of
paths in a circuit increases exponentially as the circuit size grows, it is infeasible
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Figure 4.1: Example of PSN-Related Cells.
to consider every path in the circuit explicitly. Instead, only those critical paths
identified by timing analysis tools can be considered during test generation. Un-
fortunately, the ever-increasing process variation makes circuits’ timing behavior
unpredictable, and hence there might be a large number of paths being critical.
Consequently, only a subset of critical paths can be tested based on path delay
fault model, which cannot guarantee test quality and can only be used to generate
some top-up patterns.
Due to the above, small delay defect testing has been widely accepted by the
industry, wherein we try to detect transition faults by propagating their faulty ef-
fects through long paths whenever possible. Compared to path delay testing, the
number of SDD test patterns increases almost linearly with the circuit size and we
can achieve good transition fault coverage by being able to flexibly choosing the
sensitization paths.
The above motivates us to take the circuit layout into consideration and maxi-
mize power supply noise effects for SDD testing under the consideration of func-
tional constraints. By doing so, we are able to achieve high quality delay testing
by simultaneously reducing both test escapes and test overkills of the CUTs.
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Figure 4.2: Main flow of our proposed pseudo-functional SDD test generation
methodology
4.3 Proposed Methodology
Fig. 5.4 presents the overall framework for our proposed layout-aware pseudo-
functional SDD test pattern generation procedure. Given the layout and netlist
information of circuit, we first obtain critical paths with commercial timing anal-
ysis tool, and then extract illegal states related to these critical paths based on the
method presented in [100, 49]. As can be observed from Fig. 5.4, our proposed
ATPG flow mainly contains two parts: (i). pseudo-functional SDD test cube gen-
eration; and (ii) PSN effect maximization.
To generate pseudo-functional SDD test cube, we extend the conventional SDD
test generation method presented in [54] by integrating the functional constraints
checking and breaking mechanism, which is to sensitize SDD through critical
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paths whenever possible, meanwhile, it guarantees that no illegal states is included
in the test cube. In order to satisfy functional constraints, as in [49], we repre-
sent functional constraints as phantom gates and virtually inserts these gates in
the CUT as shown in Fig. 4.3. By doing so, we can selectively activate a subset
of functional constraints by assigning logic ‘1’ at the output of the corresponding
phantom AND gates during the test pattern generation process. For example, in
order to avoid any one of fA(0);C(1)g and fA(1);B(1)g to appear in test cube, we
will assign logic ‘1’ on both F1 and F2. Then, suppose that input B has been set
as logic ‘1’ during pattern generation, implication function automatically implies
logic ‘0’ at A to break illegal state fA(1);B(1)g. Similarly,C will be then assigned
as logic ‘0’ to break illegal state fA(0);C(1)g.
Next, in terms of PSN effect maximization, for the critical paths sensitized by
the test cube, we first parse the circuit layout to identify those relevant transitions
that may induce power supply noise on it, and estimate the delay impact caused by
each transition. Then, several algorithms are introduced to justify as many relevant
transitions as possible by judiciously filling the X-bits of the test cubes without
violating functional constraints, so that the PSN effects incurred by the final test
pattern is nearly the worst-case scenario that exists in functional mode (detailed in
Section 4). After obtaining each pattern as above, we drop those transition faults
that are located on the same sensitized critical path. To note, we do not conduct
fault simulation and drop the other detected transition faults since PSN effects are
not considered for their sensitized paths yet.









Figure 4.3: Insertion and Activation of Functional Constraints as Phantom Gates
4.4 Maximizing PSN Effects under Functional Con-
straints
After obtaining pseudo-functional test cubes, our objective is to fill the X-bits to
maximize PSN effects on the sensitized critical path under functional constraints
of each SDD test pattern. We do not simply reuse the probability-based X-filling
technique presented in [49] due to its computational complexity2. Instead, we
propose an effective ATPG-like technique to fill X-bits, which is able to directly
justify the targeted transitions on relevant aggressors to required values by filling
X-bits in the test cubes. As we cannot justify all the relevant transitions simul-
taneously, the main challenge is how to effectively justify those highly-relevant
transitions as many as possible without violating functional constraints.
To tackle the above problem, we first parse the circuit layout to identify those
relevant aggressors that may induce power supply noise affecting the targeted
fault’s behavior. Then based on the distance and required transition type of ag-
gressors, the PEWagg vic is calculated according to Eq. (1) for each pair of the
2As there is no direct correlation between X-bits within test cube and the relevant sig-
nals with required transitions, time-consuming probability-based simulation is conducted
in [49] to guide the filling procedure for every test pattern.
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on-path victim cells and their respective aggressors. The PSN impact for rele-
vant transition on a specific aggressor is then calculated by summing up all the
PEWagg vic between this transition and all the on-path victims and we denote it as
transition weight (TW ). By formulating the problem as above, our objective be-
comes to maximize the total TW by justify relevant transitions as many as possible
using X-bits in the test cube, without violating functional constraints.
4.4.1 Pseudo-Functional Relevant Transitions Generation
The task to justify the maximum number of compatible transitions that lead to
PSN effects is quite challenging, as certain relevant transitions cannot be justified
simultaneously due to logic conflicts in the circuit. Since it is obviously unaccept-
able to enumerate all the possible combinations, we propose to justify the set of
relevant transitions in an incremental manner.
The flowchart of our proposed algorithm is shown in Fig. 4.4. It is composed
of four main parts. Firstly, we conduct a fast pre-processing step on the rele-
vant transition set, and try to form a compatible transition graph (CTG) in such a
way that some possible concurrently-justifiable transitions are identified by logic
implication. Next, we conduct incremental transition extraction, in which we ex-
tract the maximum clique on the CTG. The subset of transitions on this clique is
our focus in the next transition justification step, wherein several heuristics are
used to justify as many as transitions in this subset as possible3. To avoid being
trapped into local optimal solution, we also equip our algorithm with the flexibility
to search within certain range (denoted as backtracking mechanism), so as to find
better solution in the end. After processing each clique, we update CTG, find the
maximum clique and conduct transition justification again. The above procedure
3Not all transitions can be concurrently justified even for this subset in the clique as
logic implication is usually incomplete.
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Figure 4.4: Flowchart for the pseudo-functional relevant transition generation al-
gorithm
iterates until no more relevant transitions can be achieved under the consideration
of functional constraints.
Compatible Transition Graph Generation
The relevant transitions identified from the layout information may logically-conflicting
with each other. Although we are able to identify these conflicts during the logic










Figure 4.5: Example to show CTG updating
value justification process, too many conflicting transitions will dramatically in-
crease the processing burden and hence severely impact the runtime of our solu-
tion.
To resolve this problem, we conduct a pre-processing step to reduce the prob-
lem complexity, by using logic implication to build the so-called compatible tran-
sition graph (CTG) as follows. Given a test cube, two relevant transitions are
treated as compatible if there is no conflict after applying logic implication for the
two transitions. As shown in Fig. 4.5, every node on the CTG denotes a relevant
transition which is weighted by TW value, and two transitions are connected with
a edge if they are compatible. It is worth noting that building such CTG graph
is very efficient since the implication can be conducted very fast and CTG graph
construction is a one-time effort.
Incremental Transition Extraction
Before transition justification, we first extract the maximum clique of CTG in a
greedy manner and target the transitions within it.
Updating Compatible Transition Graph
After each round of transition justification , the CTG graph is to be updated.
Take the CTG depicted in Fig. 4.5 as an example. The initial clique composes of
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transitions A, B and C. Then, suppose A and B are justified while C fails. since
it is still possible that E is justifiable together with A and B, we update the CTG
by merging the justified transitions into a super-node in the graph and then cutting
off the links between the super-node and the unjustified transitions. Next, we fix
those transitions that have been justified and only put the untried transitions that
have links with the super-node into the next round of justification process. This
mechanism guarantees that our algorithm is performed on the complete relevant
transition set, i.e., not restricted by the maximum clique that we have selected at
the very beginning.
Transition Justification
We introduce two techniques to justify the required transitions as many as possible.
As both of them are based on the so-called symbolic justification mechanism, we
discuss it first.
To justify a transition, it is necessary to concurrently justify two values for the
same node in the circuit in two consecutive timeframes. As the example shown in
Fig. 4.6, wherein the circuit has been unrolled and we want to justify three transi-
tions at B, D and E. Taking transition at D as an example, there are two objects
located at B and B0 in the two timeframes, respectively. For justifying B = 1, we
need to justify both C = 0 and I = 1 on different branches since logic ‘1’ is the
non-controlled value for NOR gate. Initially, three values need to be justified for
one transition, and this number keeps increasing as justification proceeds. Suppose
that a particular transition is failed because it cannot be justified at any branch, it
is meaningless to justify the rest of the branches. Hence, we need to hold such
information at the unjustified gates to indicate which transitions it is related to.
Moreover, the to-be-justified transitions may be treated differently as they may
have different impact on PSN effects.










































js0: (BĻ, 0.23, UF)
0
js0: (BĻ, 0.15, UF)
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Figure 4.6: Example to show symbolic justification mechanism
To represent all of above, we introduce two sets of the so-called justifying sym-
bols ( js0 and js1) at the unjustified gates. Each justifying symbol is composed of a
three-tuple element including the correlated transition, the weight of the transition
and the state of the transition (i.e., the un-failed transition is labeled as UF while
the failed transition is labeled as F). js0 and js1 list the set of transitions that
require the gate to be ‘0’ and ‘1’, respectively.
Symbolic Multiple Backtracing
Starting from several unjustified values, we employ multiple backtracing tech-
nique to trace them concurrently. In conventional ATPG, the technique propagates
n0 and n1 to indicate how many times that the signal is required to be logic ‘0’
and logic ‘1’, and it simply treats every unjustified value equally important. For
our problem, however, different transitions have non-equal weight as indicated by
their TW values, and we need to have higher priority to justify those transitions
with larger TW . At the same time, we also need to remove the state of some rel-
evant transitions, since it does not make sense to consider those failed transitions.
Therefore, we propose a symbolic multiple backtracing technique that propagates










































js0: (BĻ, 0.23, UF)
0
js0: (BĻ, 0.23, UF)
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js1: (DĻ, 0.15, UF)
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js0: (EĻ, 0.08, UF)
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js0: (BĻ, 0.23, UF)
js1: (EĹ, 0.08, UF)
 (DĻ, 0.15, UF)
js1: (DĻ, 0.15, UF)
js0: (BĻ, 0.23, UF)
js0: (BĻ, 0.23, UF)
Figure 4.7: Example to show symbolic multiple backtracing
the justifying symbol list js0 and js1, based on the following rules:
 For NOT gate, duplicate the js0/ js1 to js1/ js0 of its fan-in gate;
 For the other kinds of gates, if vo at output and vi at input are the non-
controlled and non-controlling values for the gate respectively, we duplicate
the jsvo to the jsvi of all the fan-in gates; otherwise when they are the con-
trolled and controlling values for the gate respectively, we duplicate the jsvo
to the jsvi of the easiest justifiable fan-in gate, which is defined as the gate
closest to the primary/pseudo-primary input.
Following the example shown in Fig. 4.6, we use Fig. 4.7 to illustrate the pro-
cedure for justifying symbol propagation, which is depicted by the arrowed lines.
All the backward propagations stop at multi-fanout nets or at the inputs. For ex-
ample, for FF1, some transitions require it to be logic ‘1’ while others require it
to be logic ‘0’, hence we need to make value decision on such multi-fanout nets,
which is detailed in the following symbolic transition-aware implication.
Symbolic Transition-Aware Implication
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There are two major tasks in the symbolic transition-aware implication pro-
cedure. The first one is to guarantee no functional constraints is violated during
justification process. This is achieved by representing functional constraints in the
same way as depicted in Fig. 4.3. As the example shows in Fig. 4.8, suppose flip-
flops FF0 and FF1 should have the same value, we insert a phantom XOR gate P
into the circuit and assign logic ‘0’ to it. By doing so, we can detect the logic con-
flict on P if and only if these two flip-flops are assigned with the same logic value.
Once any functional constraint is violated, we stop implication for backtracking
by inverting the logic value that is last assigned at the multi-fanout net.
The second task is to make value assignment decision when multi-fanouts are
reached during the multiple backtracing process. We can observe that different
implication orders result in failures of different relevant transitions. As shown in
Fig. 4.8, starting from multi-fanout FF0 first, it is assigned with logic ‘1’ since the
js0 set is empty on it. Next, when making decision on FF1, we specify it as logic
‘0’ because the TW on B is larger than that on D. Functional constraint violation
is then detected on gate P, and backtracking is conducted to invert the logic value
on the last multi-fanout FF1. Consequently, transition on B fails.
However, suppose the decision making order is first to assign ‘0’ on FF1 and
then specify ‘1’ on FF0, the functional constraint violation results in backtracking
to invert the logic value on FF0. In this case, the justifications for E(0) and A(1)
are both dependent on Input0. According to justifying symbols on these two nodes,
we specify Input0 as logic ‘0’. This assignment inverts the logic value on A, and
correspondingly, the logic values onD, G and E 0 are all flipped, making transitions
on both E and D failed.
Based on the above observation, we propose a symbolic transition-aware im-
plication procedure that heuristically reduces the total amount of weighted failed
transitions as follows. For each reached multi-fanout during the multiple back-
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Figure 4.8: Example to show impact of implication order
tracing process, we check its js0 and js1 lists and calculate the weighted sum of
the un-failed justifying symbols on js0 and js1, which are defined asWSUJB0 and
WSUJB1, respectively. Next, WSUJB is used to store the larger value between
WSUJB0 and WSUJB1 on every reached multi-fanout. We then sort the set of
reached multi-fanouts in a non-decreasing order based on their WSUJB values.
Finally, we make value decision on multi-fanouts and perform logic implication
one by one. To be specific, starting from the first gate in sorted multi-fanout list,
we assign the corresponding logic value according toWSUJB. Then we conduct
logic implication process and some transitions may fail, hence we update the states
of the justifying symbols on each reached multi-fanout or input and then check the
multi-fanout list again. The above procedure iterates until all the reached multi-
fanouts and inputs have specified values. By doing so, the multi-fanout with higher
weighted sum of un-failed justifying symbols is processed with higher priority, and
hence we can effectively reduce the total amount of failed transitions.
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Multi-Level Backtracking Mechanism
In conventional ATPG process, backtracking is conducted as soon as a logic con-
flict is detected during implication. While for our problem, we can accept certain
amount of temporary logic conflicts that reduce the number of desired transitions
and resolve them in later stage. Consequently, we need to design a new backtrack-
ing mechanism for maximizing PSN effects, as shown in the following.
During transition justification, we denote the TTW f =TTW as the failed transi-
tion ratio (FTR), where TTW f and TTW are the total TW of the failed transitions
and that of total relevant transitions. Our initial thinking is to set one threshold
ratio value TR, and backtracks once the FTR is larger than TR. However, this
strategy is not quite effective because the optimal TR values for different set of
to-be-justified transitions vary significantly, and hence a universal threshold value
is not preferred. In order to overcome this problem, we set a series of threshold
TR = ftr0; tr1; tr2:::g arranged in an increasing order and there is some interval
between any neighboring pair. For example, TR = f10%;20%;30%:::g. For a
given set of transitions to be justified, we try the threshold values one by one in
the TR vector, and record the number of backtrackings (denoted as nBT ). Clearly,
later trials are easier with smaller nBT . In each trial, if nBT is larger than a a
pre-defined constant value maxBT , we use the next more relaxed threshold. This
procedure terminates when either a solution is found with nBT maxBT or all the
threshold levels have been tried.
4.5 Experimental Results
4.5.1 Experimental Setup
We implement our layout-aware pseudo-functional SDD pattern generation frame-
work on top of an academic ATPG tool Atalanta [93], which originally targets
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Figure 4.9: TW -Delay Correlation Plot
stuck-at faults using FAN algorithm [55]. Experiments are conducted on the largest
ISCAS’89 and IWLS’05 benchmark circuits that are available to us. We synthesize
them using UMC’s 130nm CMOS technology with 1.08V power supply voltage,
and layout them using commercial tools.
It is important to note, while the benchmark circuits used in our experiments
are still small when compared to industrial designs, we believe they are sufficient to
prove the effectiveness of the proposed technique. This is because, power supply
noises are rather “local” effects and the number of aggressors for a particular
critical path is usually not related to the overall circuit size.
4.5.2 Results and Discussion
As we mentioned in the previous section, our proposed technique does not directly
optimize the delay caused by PSN effects since we can only obtain relatively accu-
rate delay value by applying both PSN simulation and timing analysis and it is not






Random-fill under F. C. PSN Max. without F. C. Our proposed
TWr Runtime(s) TWw Runtime(s) TWo ORTW (%) OWTW (%) Runtime(s)
s5378 80.57 77.82 19.15 217.68 29.36 481.39 26.56 38.69 -9.54 591.18
s9234 80.29 81.68 24.31 120.36 38.17 892.1 30.85 26.90 -19.18 982.33
s13207 83.82 83.27 35.98 608.96 61.37 1584.29 48.65 35.21 -20.73 1985.38
s15850 82.28 64.13 28.79 267.32 50.07 983.57 38.58 34.00 -22.95 1289.65
s38417 92.76 79.32 57.8 1025.15 105.25 3215.61 91.83 58.88 -12.75 3606.9
s38584 86.29 72.56 73.45 1329.28 132.89 3504.27 115.68 57.49 -12.95 4138.5
Average 84.33 76.46 41.86 -16.35
Table 4.1: Comparison among Different SDD Patterns.
affordable to integrate such time-consuming process into our algorithm. Instead
of doing so, we employ the transition weight metric TW to evaluate the PSN ef-
fects caused by certain transition to a sensitized path and then try to maximize the
overall effective TW by generating relevant transitions on top of the original SDD
pattern. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, it is important to observe
the correlation between TW and the real circuit delay.
In our first experiment, we randomly select two original SDD test patterns
for s38417 and one pattern for des, and then we randomly fill the X-bits in test
pattern and calculate the TW sum of the activated relevant transitions for several
rounds. To obtain the delay information under PSN effects, we first perform IR-
Drop analysis on the layout with the commercial tool to extract the exact voltage on
each node of the sensitized path, and then feed this information into static timing
analysis tool to obtain the delay for the targeted path. After acquiring the delays
on corresponding pathes for these patterns, we plot TW -delay figure as shown in
Fig.4.9. It can be observed that they are not perfectly correlated. However, the
trend is quite similar and the delay increases as the growth of the activated TW in
most cases. Hence, it is with sufficient accuracy to use TW as the optimization
target in our algorithm.
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Table 5.1 shows our main experimental results, in which we generate pseudo-
functional SDD test cubes first using the techniques presented in Section 3, but fill
the X-bits in test cubes differently to obtain three kinds of SDD patterns: (1) our
proposed pseudo-functional patterns that try to maximize the PSN effects under
functional constraints; (2) pseudo-functional patterns with randomly-filled X-bits;
(3) test patterns that are generated with maximum PSN effects without considering
functional constraints.
Column 2-3 in Table 5.1 present the quality for small delay defect detection.
Transition fault coverage (TFC) is shown in Column 2 and it can be observed
that at least 80% transition faults can be covered by our pseudo-functional SDD
patterns for all the benchmark circuits. Column 3 (i.e., Path A.R.) represents the
critical path activation ratio, which is calculated as follows. We first extract those
critical paths which have at most 10% slack from the longest path in the circuit
according to static timing analysis results. Next, we remove those false paths
that are not sensitizable in functional mode and denote the remaining paths as
sensitizable paths. We then count those paths that are sensitized by our SDD
test pattern, denoted as sensitized paths. The Path A.R. is the ratio between the
sensitized paths and the sensitizable pathes. On average, there are 76% sensitizable
paths activated by our SDD patterns. This result shows that our SDD test patterns
can effectively sensitize most sensitizable critical paths in the circuit.
Columns 4-11 list the comparison among the three kinds of SDD patterns.
Columns TWr, TWw and TWo represent the average activated transition weight for
the three different kinds of patterns. ORTW and OWTW are calculated as ORTW =
TWo TWr
TWr
 100% and OWTW = TWo TWwTWw  100%, respectively. Let us first com-
pare patterns generated using the proposed solution against pseudo-functional pat-
terns with randomly-filled X-bits first. It can be observed from Column 3 that our
method can achieve up to 59% improvement for benchmark s38417, and for all
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Figure 4.10: Pattern count comparison
the benchmark circuits the average improvement is around 40%. As stated ear-
lier, while pseudo-functional testing inherently minimizes over-testing problem, it
may suffer from serious under-testing problem. The above results demonstrate the
effectiveness of our proposed algorithm by explicitly taking PSN effects into con-
sideration. When comparing against patterns with maximum PSN effects without
considering functional constraints, we can observe more than 16% less PSN effects
on average for all benchmark circuits, and scan patterns for benchmark s15850 can
result in up to 22% more power supply noises than our patterns that try to maxi-
mize PSN effects under functional constraints. This comparison indicates that it is
crucial to take functional constraints into consideration when generating SDD test
patterns. Otherwise, circuits can be over-tested, leading to significant test yield
loss. In terms of computational time, our proposed method is 10-20% longer than
that of [54], which is acceptable considering the test quality improvement provided
by our solution.
In [54], once a SDD pattern is generated, fault simulation is conducted and
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all the faults that are propagated through long paths are dropped. In our method,
however, we drop those undetected faults if and only if they are located on the path
targeted in relevant transition justification, since we need to guarantee the dropped
faults have been affected by sufficient PSN effects. Consequently, our solution
generates more test patterns than [54]. We compare the pattern count between the
two methods, as shown in the Fig.4.10. It can be observed that, the pattern count
increase is moderate and we attribute this to the fact that long paths are difficult to
be sensitized if we do not target on them during the test pattern generation process.
4.6 Conclusion
The ever-increasing sensitivity of circuits’ timing behavior to PSN effects is a se-
rious challenge for at-speed delay testing. Without considering functional con-
straints, conventional ATPG may incur either excessive or limited PSN effects on
critical paths, leading to over-testing or under-testing of the CUT. In this work,
we present a novel pseudo-functional ATPG technique to simultaneously reduce
both test overkills and test escapes in SDD testing. Experimental results on large
benchmark circuits demonstrate the benefits of the proposed solution.
2 End of chapter.
Chapter 5
In-Situ Timing Error Masking in
Logic Circuits
5.1 Introduction
With the continuous downscaling of transistor feature size, there is an increasing
uncertainty for the timing behavior of today’s integrated circuits (ICs). On one
hand, embedding a large design guard band to prevent timing errors to occur is not
an attractive solution, since this conservative design methodology diminishes the
benefit of technology scaling [106]. On the other hand, it is increasingly difficult to
rely on off-line delay testing to guarantee circuit timing correctness in functional
mode [107]. Consequently, there is a growing research interest to achieve online
timing error resilience.
Most of existing solutions for timing error resilience (e.g., the well-known Ra-
zor technique [31]) try to restore the state of the system to a known-good pre-error
state. These techniques are very effective for timing error correction (TEC) in
processors with microarchitectural support such as instruction replay, but they are
very difficult, if not impossible, to be applied to general logic circuits, due to the
65
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high cost to checkpoint error-free states in such designs.
In-situ timing error correction techniques that are able to mask errors without
any rollback, are therefore very attractive. Among the few in-situ TEC techniques
presented in the literature, most of them [108, 109, 110] rely on time-borrowing
technique to correct timing errors, by delaying the arrival time of the correct data
to the next logic level. As these techniques reduce the timing slack for the logic
level that follows speed-paths, they have difficulty to handle the case when speed-
paths exist in consecutive logic levels, limiting the applicability of such solutions.
In [111], the authors proposed to synthesize a redundant logic block that is acti-
vated only when the speed-paths of the circuit are sensitized, and use it to mask
timing errors on targeted paths. While interesting, their proposed synthesis algo-
rithm is time-consuming and the redundant logic block incurs large area overhead.
In this paper, we propose a novel in-situ timing error correction technique,
namely InTimeFix. Similar to [111], we introduce redundant logic into the orig-
inal circuit to mask timing errors on speed-paths when they are sensitized. Un-
like [111] that tries to synthesize the Boolean function that activates speed-paths
in a ”brute-force” manner, the redundant TEC circuit in InTimeFix is generated
based on the concept of approximation circuit [112, 113] and can be obtained by
simple structural analysis of the original circuit, which is of low cost and is eas-
ily scalable to large IC designs. Since the corresponding approximation circuits
for speed-paths is with simpler logic structure, a large timing slack is guaranteed
for those flip-flops driven by speed-paths (denoted by suspicious FFs) and hence
is able to mask timing errors occurring on them. The main contributions of this
paper include:
 we present a novel technique to add redundant approximation circuit into the
original design to create a logically-equivalent yet timing-improved circuit,
and prove its correctness;
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 we propose a low-cost and scalable technique to synthesize timing error
masking logic based on simple structural analysis, without necessarily ac-
quiring the characteristic function for the set of all speed-path activation
patterns;
From another perspective, InTimeFix can be also regarded as a timing opti-
mization technique, since it facilitates to improve circuit timing slack with low
hardware cost, as demonstrated in our experimental results. It is important to em-
phasize that, as a redundancy scheme, InTimeFix is compatible with other tim-
ing/power optimization techniques such as gate sizing [114] and dual Vth alloca-
tion [115], and in fact, these techniques can be combined to further improve circuit
performance under variation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 surveys prior
work for online timing error resilience and motivates this work. In Section 5.3 and
Section 5.4, we detail the proposed InTimeFix technique for in-situ correction of
timing errors on speed-paths. Experimental results on various benchmark circuits
are then presented in Section 5.5. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes this paper.
5.2 Prior Work and Motivation
In order to achieve timing error resilience, we can either predict the error occur-
rence and take proactive actions to avoid them or detect and correct timing errors
(or their effects) when they occur. Generally speaking, timing error prediction
techniques (e.g., [116]) are applicable to detect gradual increase of circuit delay
resulting from aging effects only. While Razor-like techniques are very effective
for timing error correction in microprocessors with the help of instruction replay,
they are very difficult, if not impossible, to be applied to general logic circuits, due
to the high cost to checkpoint error-free states in them. It is therefore imperative






























Figure 5.1: Timing Error Masking Scheme in [111].
to develop in-situ timing error correction techniques that are able to mask errors
without any rollback. There are a few such techniques presented in the literature
and they can be classified into two categories: temporal error masking and logic
error masking. Time-borrowing techniques for timing error correction have the
inherent weakness of error effect propagation. That is, the timing slack of the suc-
cessive logic level driven by suspicious FFs is reduced and hence some initially
non-suspicious flip-flops in this level may become suspicious ones and need to be
replaced by sequential elements with time-borrowing capability again. Due to this
timing error propagation effect, the hardware cost for such temporal error masking
techniques can be quite high.
In [111], Choudhury and Mohanram proposed to add a redundant logic block
to predict the outputs of the circuit upon application of inputs that sensitize speed-
paths. With this exact sensitization constraint, the error-masking circuit tends to
have more timing slack when compared to the original circuit, and hence is im-
mune to timing errors. As shown in Fig. 5.1, targeting those timing-critical outputs
yk; :::;ym, error masking circuit generates two outputs for each of them, e.g., y˜k and
ek for yk with potential timing error. To be specific, when a speed-path driving yk
is sensitized, ek is set correspondingly and the original circuit’s output yk is sub-
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stituted with the fast predicted value y˜k to achieve timing error resilience. While
the idea is interesting, construction of the proposed redundant logic block incurs
quite large area/power overhead, as demonstrated in their experimental results. In
addition, to synthesize such error-masking circuits is quite complex, requiring to
obtain the characteristic function for the set of all speed-path activation patterns,
which is only practical for small circuit blocks.
To sum up, process, voltage, and temperature (PVT) variations have an ever-
increasing adverse impact on the timing behavior of integrated circuits with tech-
nology scaling. While there are a few techniques shown in the literature, they
either rely on certain assumptions about the circuit structure and hence limit their
applicability, or suffer from scalability issues and cannot be easily applied in large
IC designs. This motivates the proposed InTimeFix technique to achieve low-cost
and scalable timing error resilience in logic circuits.
5.3 In-Situ Timing ErrorMasking with Approximate
Logic
The concept of approximation circuit was proposed in [112], which tries to in-
crease a microprocessor’s clock frequency by replacing a complete logic function
with a simplified circuit that mimics the function and uses rough calculations to
speculate and predict results. In [113], the authors defined approximate logic in
digital circuit as: Given two Boolean functions F and G, G0 is a 0-approximate
logic of F if G0 = 0) F = 0. Similarly, G1 is a 1-approximate logic of F if
G1 = 1 ) F = 1. Consider a Boolean function F = a+ b+ a¯cd, there are 13
out of total 16 minterms in its truth table that output logic 1 while the other 3
minterms output logic 0. A 1-approximate logic function of F is G1= a+b. This
approximate function covers 12 out of 13 minterms for F = 1 minterms and can
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be implemented with one logic gate. Similarly, a 0-approximate logic function of
F is G0= a+b+ c, which covers 2 out of 3 minterms for F = 0.
Generally speaking, since the approximate logic is with much simpler logic
structure when compared to the original circuit, the computation latency is smaller.
The basic idea of the proposed InTimeFix technique is to generate approximate
logic for the original logic function of suspicious FFs in such manner that it covers
all the logic minterms that sensitize speed-paths.
5.3.1 Equivalent Circuit Construction with
Approximate Logic
Given a logic circuit that implements Boolean function F , suppose G0 is a 0-
approximate logic for F andG1 is a 1-approximate logic for F and we denote by P,
P0 and P1 all the minterms in F’s truth table, the minterms covered by G0 and the
minterms covered byG1, respectively. Now, let us construct a circuit F 0=F G0+
G1 as shown in Fig. 5.2. We define dG0(P0), dG1(P0) and dF(P0) as the worst-
case delay among all minterms in P0 through circuit G0, G1 and F , respectively.
Similarly, dG0(P1), dG1(P1), dF(P1) and dF(P P0 P1) are defined. dAB is the
total propagation delay of AND gate A and OR gate B. Assuming approximate
logic G0 and G1 are implemented with simpler logic structures when compared to
original circuit F and hence has less computation latency (e.g., dG0(P0)¡dF(P0),
dG1(P0)¡dF(P0) and dG1(P1)¡dF(P1)), we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2 The circuit shown in Fig. 5.2, F 0=F G0+G1, is logically-equivalent
to the original circuit F, and its worst-case timing delay is maxfdF(P  P0 
P1);dG0(P0);dG1(P0);dG1(P1)g+dAB.
proof 2 When the original circuit F outputs 1, by applying counter-positive law,
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Figure 5.2: Equivalent Circuit with Approximate Logic.
its 0-approximate logic must also output 1 (i.e., G0 = 1), and hence F 0 = 1. Sim-
ilarly, when the original circuit F outputs 0, by applying counter-positive law, its
1-approximate logic must also output 0 (e.g., G1 = 0), and hence F 0 = 0. Conse-
quently, F and F 0 are logically-equivalent.
To obtain the worst-case delay for this equivalent circuit F 0, let us consider the
circuit delay before the shaded logic block in Fig. 5.2 for the following three cases,
corresponding to application of inputs belonging to different set of minterms of the
truth table of F=F 0.
 When the inputs applied to the circuit belong to P0, G0 outputs control-
ling value 0 for AND gate A after dG0(P0) and dominates the path through
the original circuit F with longer delays. The worst-case delay would be
maxfdG0(P0);dG1(P0)g. Note that dG1(P0) is the time spent to settle G1 to
be non-controlling value 0 for OR gate B.
 When the inputs applied to the circuit belong to P1, G1 outputs controlling
value 1 for OR gate B after dG1(P1) and it dominates the path through the
original circuit F and G0. The worst-case delay in this case is therefore
simply dG1(P1).
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 When the inputs applied to the circuit belong to P P0 P1, we have to
wait for the original circuit F to settle down, and hence the worst-case delay
would be dF(P P0 P1).
The worst-case timing delay for circuit F’ is therefore maxfdF(P P0 P1);
dG0(P0); dG1(P0); dG1(P1)g+ dAB, after considering the time spent on gates A
and B.
From manufacturing test perspective, adding redundancy into the circuit may
introduce untestable faults, and there is no exception for the above design. For
example, the stuck-at-1 fault at the output of G0 is untestable, because to activate
this fault, we need to set it as logic ‘0’, but when G0 = 0, the original circuit F
will also output logic ‘0’, preventing the propagation of its faulty effect to outputs.
Similarly, the stuck-at-0 fault at the output of G1 is untestable. It is important to
note that, the presence of such faults would not affect the functional correctness
of the circuit. At the same time, they do render the corresponding timing error
masking logic to be ineffective, but the likelihood for such faults to exist is quite
low due to their small sizes.
One way to make these faults testable is to add some design-for-testability
(DfT) circuit, e.g., adding additional flip-flop to be driven by G0/G1 directly. This,
however, increases the hardware cost and also prolongs the propagation delay on
approximate logic paths due to extra load. Alternatively, we can rely on delay
testing to guarantee the timing correctness of the corresponding speed-paths. In
other words, as long as the path can pass at-speed test, its timing correctness is
guaranteed and we do not need to care whether these untestable faults exit or not.
5.3.2 Timing Error Masking with Approximate Logic
Generally speaking, a suspicious FF is driven by multiple paths, and timing errors
may occur only when speed-paths are sensitized. In other words, timing errors
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may be activated by only a few minterms of the truth table for a suspicious FF,
denoted as critical minterms. Motivated by this observation and the performance
upper bound theorem shown earlier, if all the critical minterms are covered with
approximate logic, we can achieve large timing slack and mask potential timing
errors. The question now becomes how to efficiently construct redundant approxi-
mate logic for speed-paths?
Consider an example circuit shown in Fig. 5.3, wherein path P fInput1, A, D,
H, F , G, I, Jg is a speed-path. When logic ‘1’ is applied at Input1 and propagates
along this path to generate logic ‘0’ at the receiving end, we have to assign logic
‘1’ at the side-input1 of gate A. This is because, logic ‘1’ is a non-controlling
value of AND gate, and the output of A will be dominated by the side-input if it is
assigned with controlling value. Similarly, side-inputs of gate F and gate I have to
be assigned as non-controlling value (see Fig. 5.3).
Let us define the side-inputs on the path that need to have deterministic non-
controlling values (marked in shade) as essential side-inputs. Based on the above
discussion, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2 To cover all the critical minterms that sensitize a particular speed-path
is equivalent to approximate its essential side-inputs.
With the above, we can construct redundant approximate logic for each speed-
path by simple structural analysis. Again, take path P in Fig. 5.3 as an example.
Suppose we would like to construct 0-approximate logic for this path, we first
duplicate the entire path and then gradually remove those gates without essential
side-inputs.
To be specific, the removing process is conducted structurally by analyzing the
targeted speed-path P reversely from the ending gate (i.e., gate G) to the sending
1Given a path P = fG0, G1,...Gmg, for a specific gate Gi, Gi 1 is the on-input signal of
Gi, while other input signals of Gi are side-inputs.





































Redundant Circuit for In -Situ Timing 
Error Masking on Speed-Paths
Figure 5.3: Speed-Path Approximation.
gate (i.e., gate A). Consider gate J, since it is dominated by its on-input with
controlling value 0, we can remove it from the approximate logic. Similarly, gate
G and gate D are not needed. While the outputs of gates F and A are determined
by both on-input and side-input signals, two gates need to be duplicated in the 0-
approximate logic, and the side-inputs are connected to the same net as path P in
the original circuit. As shown in Fig. 5.3, the 0-approximate logic constructed as
above will output logic ‘0’ if and only if the speed-path P in the original circuit
is sensitized with launching value logic ‘1’. The 1-approximate logic for speed-
path P can be constructed similarly (see Fig. 5.3). Since the approximate logic is
with much simpler logic structure and the delay of the masking logic is usually
insignificant (without necessarily sizing it up), we can achieve large timing slack
and mask potential timing errors on speed-paths.
Note that, not all kinds of logic cells have controlling values for their inputs,
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e.g., XOR/XNOR gate. If a speed-path contains such kind of logic cells, their
side-inputs will be treated as essential side-inputs to have deterministic values to
approximate and the proposed methodology is applicable to such designs.
5.4 Cost-Efficient Synthesis for InTimeFix
Adding redundant approximate logic facilitates to achieve timing error resilience
on speed-paths. As the construction of the approximate logic needs to take side-
input signals from the original circuit, however, two potential problems arise: (i)
the latencies for side-inputs may become a concern for the propagation delay of
the approximate logic and such side-inputs are denoted as critical side-inputs (for-
mally defined later); (ii) the increased loading capacitance on side-inputs can pro-
long the delay of those paths going through them. The above observation motivate
us to propose a cost-efficient and scalable synthesis framework to resolve these
issues, as illustrated in Fig. 5.4.
Figure 5.4: InTimeFix Synthesis Framework.
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5.4.1 Overall Flow
Fig. 5.4 describes the synthesis overflow for InTimeFix. With the optimized circuit
netlist and the corresponding timing information in standard delay format (SDF),
we firstly identify those suspicious FFs that are driven by speed-paths and thus
need to be considered. Speed-paths are defined as those paths whose propagation
delays exceed a threshold value, e.g., 80% of the maximum path delay. Note
that, although static timing analysis is not able to output accurate timing values,
its accuracy is sufficient for suspicious FF identification because we only need a
comparative relationship among paths and we can always tune the threshold to
tradeoff between the hardware cost and protection strength.
Next, a set of so-called prime critical segments is extracted from speed-paths,
defined as the segments of speed-paths that do not include any critical side-inputs,
with which approximate logic can be safely generated with more timing slack.
Then, a heuristic method is used to merge prime critical segments to minimize
the hardware cost of the approximate logic and the extra loading capacitance of
side-inputs. Finally, approximate logic is generated for the merged prime critical
segments and inserted into the original circuit as redundant resources, as shown in
Section 3.2. In the following, we present the algorithms for prime critical segment




Figure 5.5: Example to Illustrate the Critical Side-Input.
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5.4.2 Prime Critical Segment Extraction
Before introducing the details of our proposed algorithm, let us first formally de-
fine the criteria used to classify critical side-input, as depicted in Fig. 5.5. Tak-
ing side-input H as an example, when considering the critical flip-flop CFF, we
have the worst case arrival time ATH on side-input H, the propagation delay PDH
from H to CFF, and the worst case arrival time ATCFF on CFF. Suppose RD is
a pre-defined reduced delay (i.e., extra slack) that we want to achieve and MD is
the delay of the masking logic, then H is a critical side-input if ATCFF   (ATH +
PDH +MD) > RD. The basic idea behind this definition is that, if this criteria
is not satisfied, there is sufficient timing slack on this side-input and it does not
affect the timing of the approximate logic at all. Based on the above definition,
we denote a gate on speed-path to be prime critical gate if all its side-inputs are
non-critical. Furthermore, a segment of a speed-path is a prime critical segment if
it only consists of prime critical gates.
Our proposed prime critical segment extraction algorithm (denoted as ExPriSeg)
is shown in Algorithm 1, where, Gate is one gate on the speed-path and Segment
is the parameter to store the targeted segment; SegmentSet denotes the set of ex-
tracted prime critical segments; while Ogate and Cside represent the on-input and
critical side-input of Gate, respectively.
To relax the timing slack to a critical flip-flop by RD, we need to reduce the
delay of all the speed-paths connected to it. Here we regard an extracted prime
critical segment as a legal one if the approximate logic for it is able to reduce the
delay of the targeted speed-path for at least RD. Starting from a specific critical
flip-flop, our algorithm extracts the prime critical segments by recursively tracing
its fan-in cone in a depth-first manner. Initially, Segment is empty and Gate is the
input gate of the targeted critical flip-flop. During the tracing procedure, once a
primary input or a flip-flop, denoted as PI or FF, is reached (Line 2), function
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Algorithm 1: Extract Prime Critical Segment(ExPriSeg)
input: Gate,Segment
begin1
if PI or FF is reached then2
if Segment is not illegal then3
return FailToExtract;4
else5
add Segment into SegmentSet;6
return SucceedToExtract;7
if Gate is prime critical gate then8
add Gate into Segment;9
find the on-input Ogate;10
return ExPriSeg(Ogate,Segment);11
else12
if Segment is legal then13









returns FailToExtract if there is no legal prime critical segment found, otherwise
we keep the Segment and return SucceedToExtract. Suppose Gate is detected to
be a prime critical gate, we add Gate into Segment and keep on tracing its on-
input gate. On the other hand, if Gate is not a prime critical gate (Line 12), we
first check whether the current Segment is legal or not. The searching process is
stopped by storing Segment and return SucceedToExtract if Segment is legal prime
critical segment, otherwise, we empty the current Segment and start to trace each
critical side-input separately. Clearly, the extracted prime critical segments can
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cover all the speed-paths ending at the targeted flip-flop if the final returned value
is SucceedToExtract. Suppose it returns FailToextract, we will try to reduce the
value of RD by a pre-defined ratio, and the same search is conducted again. One
thing to note is that our method tends to extract legal prime critical segments that
are close to the targeted flip-flops, and they are able to cover more speed-paths, if
any.
5.4.3 Prime Critical Segment Merging
The prime critical segments extracted from different critical flip-flops are likely to
be merged to further reduce hardware cost. As the example shown in Fig. 5.6, two
prime critical segments fE;D; :::C;Ag and fE;D; :::C;Bg can share a merged prime
critical segment fE;D; :::Cg. Furthermore, we notice that our extracted prime crit-
ical segments are not in the most compact format. Taking segment fE;D; :::C;Ag
as an example, it is not necessary to approximate the entire segment, instead, only
by approximating fE;D; :::Cg is enough to achieve RD delay reduction. We denote
the length (i.e., the number of logic gates) of the shortest legal subpart of prime
critical segment as the essential length, and represent the length of the remaining
part as the redundant length. For the sake of simplicity, we regard a subpart of a
prime critical segment still legal if the length of the subpart is larger than the es-
sential length. Therefore, two prime critical segments can be merged if the length
of the shared part is larger than both of their essential lengths.
Merged Prime 
Critical Segment
Figure 5.6: Prime Critical Segment Merging: An Example.
The main flow of our proposed prime critical segment merging algorithm is
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shown in Fig. 5.7, comprising the following steps:
1. Starting from the extracted prime critical segment set, we first sort them
in non-decreasing order in terms of their redundant length. The basic idea
behind this step is that we need to first fix those prime critical segment with
less flexibility. Then, all the segments are merged by iteratively applying the
following steps.
2. We always select the top un-processed segment and employ a heuristic method
to find the optimal subpart. First of all, the closest-to-output gate on the
selected segment shared by most remaining un-processed segments is iden-
tified. Taking the circuit shown in Fig. 5.6 as example, gate C is picked
first if the selected segment is fE;D;C;Ag since it has higher probability
to replace the most remaining un-processed segments by backwardly trac-
ing the selected segment from this gate, say, segment fE;D;Cg. Suppose
that the length of fE;D;Cg is less than the essential length, we extend this
sub-segment to fE;D;C;Ag and such extension is conducted until the length
requirement is satisfied. Suppose the length of fE;D;Cg is larger than the
essential length, we enumerate all the possible legal subparts to identify the
one that includes minimal number of side-inputs in the hope that increased
loading capacitance is minimized when inserting approximate logic. Finally,
the optimal segment is fixed.
3. The remaining un-processed segments are checked to determine whether
they can be replaced by newly fixed segment. The replaceable segments are
labeled as processed.
4. The procedure terminates if all the segments have been processed, otherwise
it goes back to step 2.
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s38417 24370 1636 78 570 2.34 35.34 31.93 3.41 9.64 0.09
s38584 21066 1426 12 98 0.47 20.50 18.49 2.01 9.80 0.1
des perf 154323 9105 89 592 0.38 7.80 6.68 1.12 14.36 0.95
wb conmax 75352 3316 277 1160 1.54 8.47 7.74 0.73 8.59 0.4
ethernet 157841 10752 28 386 0.24 8.21 7.11 1.10 13.38 1.083
Ave. 0.89 11.15
Table 5.1: Experimental Results on Improved Timing Slack and Hardware Cost.
5.5 Experimental Results
5.5.1 Experimental Setup
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed InTimeFix technique, we conduct
experiments on two large ISCAS’89 benchmark circuits, s38417 and s38584, as
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Benchmark



















s38417 570 34.70 31.93 7.99 31.93 1050 27.90 508 12.63
s38584 98 19.96 18.49 7.36 15.18 1217 13.85 71 8.81
des perf 592 6.95 6.68 3.88 6.43 5937 6.06 1309 5.85
wb conmax 1160 7.47 7.74 -3.61 5.38 4008 4.88 561 9.42
ethernet 386 7.23 7.11 1.73 6.15 8257 5.25 314 14.61
Ave. 3.47 10.26
Table 5.2: Comparison on Timing Slack Improvement: Gate Sizing vs. InTimeFix.
well as three large IWLS benchmark circuits, wb conmax, ethernet and des perf,
which are the largest benchmark circuits available to the public domain.
In the experimental flow, we first synthesize the benchmark circuits with a
commercial tool to obtain the optimized circuit netlist and its SDF timing informa-
tion, under 0.13µm CMOS technology. They are then fed to InTimeFix to generate
redundant approximate logic to mask potential timing errors, targeting speed-paths
within 20% of the longest path delay. Finally, commercial timing analyzer is ap-
plied to evaluate the solution, and the quality of the solution is demonstrated by the
extra timing slack achieved with the new circuit when compared with the original
one.
5.5.2 Results and Discussion
Table 5.1 present our experimental results. When comparing the worst case delay
(WCD) between the original circuit and the one equipped with redundant approx-
imiate logic (Columns 6-9), it can be observed that the proposed solution is able to
achieve 11.15% timing slack relaxation on average. On the other hand, as shown
in Column 3, the hardware cost (the unit of cost is the area of smallest 2 input AND
gates) introduced in the proposed InTimeFix technique to achieve the above timing
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Figure 5.8: Circuit Timing under Process Variation
slack is extremely low, less than 0.89% on average. As can be seen from Column
10, the runtime to process the largest benchmark circuit ethernet takes less than
one second. Consequently, we believe the proposed methodology can be easily
scalable to large industrial designs.
A close examination of the experimental results show that benchmark circuits
s38417 andwb conmax consume the largest percentage of hardware overhead. The
reason is that the speed-paths in these two benchmarks are quite evenly distributed
and the prime critical segments identified from different critical flip-flops are more
likely to be independent to each other. Therefore, the hardware cost is higher than
other benchmark circuits. To have a better design tradeoff, we try to reduce the
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hardware cost for these two benchmarks by gradually removing the approximation
logic on the shortest speed-paths. Even when the hardware cost is reduced to less
than 1%, we can still achieve 7.1% and 11.6% slack relaxation for wb conmax and
s38417, respectively.
With the above experimental results, we can observe clear advantages of the
proposed InTimeFix technique over [111], without performing direct comparisons.
In [111], the authors conducted experiments on a number of benchmark circuits
whose sizes are less than 2000 gates. Their experimental results show that, on
average 18% area overhead is required to mask timing errors on speed-paths within
10% of the longest path delay (the minimum overhead is 4%).
While not targeting timing error resilience, gate sizing is an effective technique
to improve circuit timing. In our next experiment, we compare our InTimeFix
solution against a greedy gate sizing technique [114]. Firstly, when we constrain
the area overhead for gate sizing solution to be the same as the one with InTimeFix
in earlier experiment, it can be seen that InTimeFix outperforms gate sizing in most
cases (except wb conmax), and the average improvement is 3.47%, which proves
the cost-efficiency of the proposed solution. Next, since InTimeFix is compatible
with gate sizing technique, we combine the two solutions in such manner that we
first employ gate sizing to improve circuit timing until no further benefits can be
achieved and then apply InTimeFix on top of it. We can observe that, without
area constraints, gate sizing can significantly improve circuit performance, but at
considerable area and power cost. InTimeFix is able to provide additional 10.26%
timing slack on average, and the area cost is still quite small.
Finally, we evaluate the impact of process variation on the proposed InTimeFix
architecture, using Monte Carlo simulation. According to [119], we assume there
is 10% variation on each standard cell. The results are depicted in Fig. 5.8, where
we plot and compare the WCD distributions of two sets of circuits (i.e. the black
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pile represents set of processed circuits and the gray one denotes the original set
of circuits) for the three large IWLS circuits. As can be seen from the figure,
even for circuit with InTimeFix approximate logic under the worst case process
variation corner, it has smaller or similar WCD when comparing with that of the
original circuit under the best case scenario. Moreover, it can be observed that
the number of the closer-to-mean chips increases and the standard deviation of
WCD distribution shrinks with InTimeFix. In particular, as can be observed in
Fig. 5.8(a), benchmark circuit des perf with InTimeFix has only one third of the
distribution width when compared to that of the original circuit.
The above phenomenon demonstrates that the proposed InTimeFix technique
facilitates to tolerate process variation effects. The reason is that our proposed
method effectively reduces the number of logic elements on the critical paths and
also shrinks the variation, behind which the mathematic principle can be explained
by the example given in [120]: assuming inverters have independent gaussian de-
lay distribution (µ;s), the delay of a path including n inverters obey the gaussian
distribution (nµ;
p
ns). Clearly, less n leads to smaller deviation.
5.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel in-situ timing error correction technique, namely
InTimeFix, by introducing redundant approximate logicwith more timing slack for
speed-paths in the circuit. The proposed synthesis methodology for the redundant
circuit only relies on simple structural analysis of the original circuit, and hence it
can be easily scalable to large IC designs. Experimental results demonstrate that
the proposed solution can effectively increase circuit timing slack with very low
cost.
2 End of chapter.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
Timing uncertainty issue caused by aggressive technology scaling has significantly
threatened ICs’ reliability, which creates several challenges on building a reliable
system with unreliable devices.
To address the above issues, we develop efficient and effective FPI techniques
to identify those timing-independent false paths that cannot be sensitized under
any signal arrival time condition in integrated circuits, which facilitate us to find
much more false paths than conventional methods. The identified false paths not
only helps us to generate better timing result and improves the circuit performance,
but also alleviates the burden of timing optimization algorithms and saves the un-
necessary cost used to reduce the false paths delay. Then, we present a novel
pseudo-functional ATPG technique to simultaneously reduce both test overkills
and test escapes in SDD testing. The proposed method enhance test quality by
capturing accurate worst-case delay. Finally, we propose a novel in-situ timing
error correction technique, by introducing redundant approximate logic with more
timing slack for speed-paths in the circuit. The proposed synthesis methodology
for the redundant circuit only relies on simple structural analysis of the original
circuit, and hence it can be easily scalable to large IC designs.
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There are several important topics yet to explore for future work. To continue
the technology scaling, we have to accept some infrequent timing errors in circuit’s
the usage phase in the near future. As mentioned in this thesis, several works have
been done to tolerate timing error. In order to obtain better power and performance
tradeoff, it is possible to construct cross layer timing error resilience mechanism,
which is able to tolerate errors at different abstract layer with different cost. To
achieve this, several fundamental issues need be solved: (i) how to evaluate error
propagation impact at different layers? (ii) how to design the error information in-
terface to pass the error status from circuit layer to high layer; (iii) how to estimate
recover or masking cost for different layers? (iv) how to verify the correctness and
the error coverage of proposed error tolerant mechanism? Secondly, motivated
by the factor that error recover or masking cost is related to timing error rate, it
is essentially to take into consideration the error rate information when designing
a error tolerant system, so that the power consumption and performance benefits
can be enhanced. Moreover, since the timing error rate is dependent on input
vector sequence, which can only be extracted at online stage. Therefore, we can
explore the online tuning techniques such as voltage frequency scaling to achieve
application-aware timing error tolerance. Finally, the traditional at-speed delay
test is performed in a deterministic manner, yet the timing error tolerant circuit is
inherently timing error resilience. Therefore, how to conduct delay testing on such
a circuit is questionable.
2 End of chapter.
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